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SHAREHOLDERS IN THE JURY BOX: 
A POPULIST CHECK AGAINST CORPORATE 
MISMANAGEMENT 
Ann M. Scarlett*
The recent subprime mortgage disaster exposed corporate officers 
and directors who mismanaged their corporations, failed to exercise 
proper oversight, and acted in their self-interest.  Two previous waves 
of corporate scandals in this decade revealed similar misconduct.  
After the initial scandals, Congress and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission attempted to prevent the next crisis in corporate 
governance through legislative and regulatory actions such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Those attempts failed.  Shareholder 
derivative litigation has also failed because judges accord corporate 
executives great deference and thus rarely impose liability for 
breaches of fiduciary duties. 
To prevent the next crisis in corporate governance, the answer is not 
to enact more laws but to change the enforcer of the current laws.  
That enforcer already exists—the civil jury.  Most states, however, 
deny any right to jury trial for shareholder derivative litigation.  In 
these states, shareholders largely fail in their attempts to hold 
corporate executives liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.  
Extending a jury trial right to all states would reinvigorate 
shareholder derivative litigation and offer a populist check against 
corporate executives’ misconduct.  This simple change would coerce 
corporate executives to properly oversee their companies and fulfill 
their fiduciary duties because they would know that their misconduct 
would be adjudicated by a jury of average Americans—similar to their 
shareholders.  Empowering the civil jury would also help restore 
shareholders’ trust in corporate management, which could rebuild 
confidence in the stock markets.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent subprime mortgage crisis, credit meltdown, and stock 
market collapse exposed mismanagement, oversight failures, and self-
interested transactions by directors and officers of numerous 
corporations.  These events alarmed shareholders, bond investors, and 
the public as the entire economy suffered.  Much of the financial 
collapse was linked to the securitization of mortgages and related 
products.  Corporate executives created and perpetuated such 
instruments to benefit themselves through short-term transactions that 
looked good on paper and increased stock prices, but they failed to 
conduct due diligence and consider the risks to the long-term interests of 
their corporations, shareholders, and employees.  The current executive 
compensation system, which rewards directors and officers for these 
short-term moves, has evolved into a scheme for corporate executives to 
enrich themselves while swindling shareholders.1
The corporate scandals brought to light by the current financial 
turmoil are not the first of this decade.  The first wave of scandals began 
in 2001 at corporations such as Enron and WorldCom.  These scandals 
revealed corporate officers indulging in “greed-driven schemes and 
other abuses,” while directors turned a blind eye so long as stock prices 
continued to rise.2  Several years later, the second surge of scandals 
involved directors and officers backdating their stock options to profit 
themselves at the expense of shareholders. 3  All three waves of scandals 
this decade share a common thread; all revealed directors and officers 
acting in their self-interest and without proper regard for their 
corporations, shareholders, and employees. 
Congress responded to the initial scandals by enacting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed new requirements on the 
1. See Op-Ed., With New Pay Rules, Bankers Get What They Deserve, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 
2009, at 12A. 
 2. E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional 
Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441–42 (2003) (noting that the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals revealed that “(1) officers ran amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and other abuses; and 
(2) directors allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the market while they 
contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices”). 
3. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 918 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Stock options ‘backdating’ 
is a practice whereby a public company issues options on a particular date while falsely recording that 
the options were issued on an earlier date when the company’s stock was trading at a lower price.  The 
options are purportedly issued with an exercise price equal to the market price on the date of the option 
grant.  But, in fact, because the grant dates were falsified, the options were ‘in the money’ when 
granted.”); see also Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top 
Officials Take a Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (discussing backdating scandals at, among other 
companies, Apple Computer Inc., McAfee Inc., Monster Worldwide Inc., and Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.). 
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officers and directors of publicly traded corporations.4  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented SOX by adopting 
numerous new regulations on corporations and corporate executives.5
Additionally, SOX required the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ to impose new requirements on public companies.6
Shareholders also responded to the initial scandals by attempting to 
influence corporate governance with nonbinding shareholder proposals 
designed to prevent directors from entrenching themselves in their 
positions or from promoting their own interests at the expense of 
shareholders.7  Yet the scandals continued. 
These new statutes and regulations failed to prevent future crises in 
corporate governance.  Litigation remains the primary remedy for 
shareholders when corporate executives commit acts of mismanagement, 
malfeasance, abuse, or abdicate their responsibility to oversee corporate 
employees.  Shareholder litigation, however, rarely succeeds in holding 
corporate executives liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.  
Shareholder derivative litigation often fails because judges have 
historically protected directors and officers from liability for such 
breaches.  Rather than change the laws governing corporations again, a 
change in the enforcer of the existing fiduciary duty laws is needed.  
That enforcer already exists—the civil jury.  Making civil juries the 
enforcer would prevent the next crisis by reinvigorating shareholder 
derivative litigation. 
Most states deny any right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative 
litigation.  This is unfortunate because extending the right to a jury trial 
to shareholder derivative litigation offers a populist check against 
corporate executives and judges.  Giving juries the power to hold 
corporate executives liable for their actions will strike fear in the hearts 
of corporate executives, who routinely avoid juries at all cost.  Knowing 
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1 & 7241 (2006). 
5. See David Martin, Compliance Obligations under Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Related SEC 
Regulations, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., June 2005, at 6 (summarizing the numerous SEC 
regulations adopted in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (forcing listing companies to impose more restrictive 
requirements on public companies); NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2004) (stating new, 
more restrictive definition of director independence); NASDAQ STOCK MKT., INC., MARKETPLACE 
RULES R. 4200(a)(15) (2004) (similar). 
7. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 527–28 (2005) (stating that 
during the 2003 proxy season, shareholder proposals achieved majority votes on initiatives such as 
eliminating staggered boards, separating the CEO position from the chairman of the board position, 
limiting executive compensation, and eliminating poison pill defenses); see also Alistair Barr, Settlement 
Fever Grips Companies as Proxy Season Looms, THOMSON FIN. NEWS, Mar. 4, 2006 (reporting in 2006 
that more companies were settling with activist shareholders to avoid potentially damaging and 
embarrassing proxy contests at annual meetings). 
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they will be judged by a jury of American citizens similar to their 
shareholders, corporate executives’ conduct may become more aligned 
with the interests of shareholders than their own.  Empowering juries 
may help restore the confidence of shareholders, bond investors, and 
stock markets. 
After briefly explaining shareholder derivative litigation, Part II of 
this Article summarizes the key events that contributed to the current 
financial plight.  Although Congress and the SEC have unsuccessfully 
attempted legislative and regulatory responses to previous corporate 
governance crises, the civil jury has not yet been fully utilized to check 
corporate executives’ behavior.  Part II next describes the current right 
to a jury trial, and explains that most states do not allow any right to a 
jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation because derivative litigation 
has historically been considered equitable and civil juries have been 
viewed negatively.  Part III considers the negative views of the civil jury 
and demonstrates such criticisms are undermined by empirical research 
examining civil juries.  Part IV then explains why juries are preferable to 
judges.  It examines the strong historical and democratic foundations of 
the civil jury in the United States and explains the benefits of a civil jury 
as the decisionmaker.  Finally, Part V explains how to expand the right 
to a jury trial in all shareholder derivative litigation.  It also considers the 
potential advantages and disadvantages, both theoretically and 
normatively, of such an expansion and methods for improving civil 
juries’ performance in derivative actions.  The Article concludes that 
expanding jury trials in shareholder derivative litigation may improve 
corporate oversight by coercing directors and officers to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties lest they be judged by a jury. 
II. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, AND 
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
An inherent tension exists between authority and accountability in 
publicly held and large privately held corporations because of the 
separation between management and ownership.  Shareholders elect the 
corporation’s board of directors8 and the law gives the board virtually 
unlimited authority to manage the corporation.9  So if the shareholders 
8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b) & 212(b) (2009); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§§ 7.29 & 8.03(c) (2005). 
9. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the 
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by 
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”). 
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believe that the corporation’s directors are not acting in the corporation’s 
best interests, they may theoretically hold those directors accountable by 
electing new directors to the board.10  In reality, however, the existing 
board nominates the slate of directors on which shareholders vote at the 
shareholders’ annual meeting.11  Shareholders who want to nominate 
their own slate of directors usually must mount a costly and difficult 
proxy contest.12  Shareholders possess even less power on other matters, 
because they have “no power to initiate corporate action” and have the 
right to vote only on mergers, sales, dissolution, and amendments to the 
corporate charter and bylaws.13  Consequently, when shareholders 
believe directors and officers have mismanaged the corporation, failed to 
exercise proper oversight, or acted in their self-interest, they commonly 
resort to a shareholder derivative lawsuit. 
A shareholder derivative lawsuit is filed by shareholders on behalf of 
the corporation.  In such lawsuits, the cause of action and any monetary 
recovery belongs to the corporation because it was corporation that    
was injured.14  Generally, the board of directors controls the 
corporation’s litigation because it has the statutory authority to manage 
the corporation and its assets.15  A shareholder may bring a derivative 
action only after presenting the board with a demand, which is a request 
that the board rectify the challenged decision.16  If the board rejects the 
10. Cf. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability and Global 
Governance 3–4 (Harv. Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov’t, Politics Research Group, Working Paper 
No. 01-4, 2001) (“Accountability can be created through actions ‘in the shadow of elections.’”). 
 11. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 105–06 n.133 (2004). 
 12. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5.4, at 394–96 (1986).  However, the advent 
of electronic proxy voting may make such proxy contests cheaper and easier.  Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807 n.47 (2007) (stating that electronic 
proxy voting may “make it much cheaper and easier for dissenting shareholders to mount a proxy 
battle”). 
 13. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 105 (listing shareholder rights as “election of directors and 
approval of charter or by-law amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporation’s assets, 
and voluntary dissolution.” Id. at 105 n.133).  Bainbridge also noted that “only electing directors and 
amending the by-laws do not require board approval before shareholder action is possible.”  Id. at 105 
n.133 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2001)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569–72 (2003) 
(discussing the weak control rights of shareholders). 
 14. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 8.2, at 362 (2002).  A 
shareholder may file a direct action if the cause of action belongs to the shareholder individually, for 
example in claims involving oppression of minority shareholders.  Id. § 8.2, at 362–63. 
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2005) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the 
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by 
or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”). 
16. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
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demand, then the shareholder must demonstrate that the demand was 
wrongfully rejected.17  In some states, the shareholder can forego 
making a demand and argue that demand is excused, if the shareholder 
can show that demand would be futile.18  To establish that demand 
would be futile or that the board wrongfully rejected the demand, the 
shareholder must typically show that a majority of directors either 
participated in the challenged decision or are otherwise interested in the 
challenged transaction.19  In other words, a trial court will permit a 
shareholder derivative lawsuit to proceed only when the board of 
directors is disabled by some conflict of interest.  The law presumes that 
directors will not agree to sue themselves in such circumstances. 
Shareholder derivative litigation encompasses three primary 
categories: (1) actions against directors to enjoin pending mergers or 
sales, (2) actions against third parties seeking monetary recovery on 
behalf of the corporation, and (3) actions against directors or officers 
seeking monetary recovery for misconduct, malfeasance, abuse, or 
failure of oversight.  Because injunctive relief is always an equitable 
decision for a judge, derivative actions in the first category are not the 
focus of this Article.20  The derivative actions in the other two categories 
seek monetary recovery for the corporation and would possess the right 
to a jury trial if the corporation itself pursued the actions.  This Article 
focuses primarily on the third category because it is the category most 
directly implicated by this decade’s corporate scandals. 
Shareholder derivative litigation rarely succeeds in holding directors 
liable for their decisions because such litigation faces many judicial 
obstacles.  A primary obstacle is the business judgment rule defense.  
The Delaware Supreme Court, which is commonly followed by other 
states on corporate law matters,21 articulates the business judgment rule 
defense as a presumption that directors have acted consistent with their 
fiduciary duties in making corporate decisions.22  This defense is based 
 17. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 14, § 8.5, at 395; see also Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the 
Director?  Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 
(2005) (stating that “although shareholders can challenge” directors’ rejection of a demand request, 
“most courts defer to boards on this matter”). 
 18. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm 
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
19. See id.; see also Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
20. See infra Part II.B. 
21. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of 
other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”); Andrew 
D. Arons, In Defense of Defensive Devices: How Delaware Discouraged Preventive Measures in 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 130 (2004) (“[M]ost states look towards 
Delaware’s corporate law decisions for guidance in their own holdings . . . .”). 
22. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 
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on the justification that the board of directors is vested with the statutory 
authority to manage the corporation.23  Defendants in derivative actions 
can invoke the business judgment rule defense at multiple points during 
litigation—including in pretrial motions for dismissal or summary 
judgment, and even at trial.24  Consequently, the judge possesses a great 
deal of power to end shareholder derivative litigation in favor of 
defendants.  Indeed, judges invoke the business judgment rule defense to 
protect boards of directors from legal liability in the vast majority of 
such cases.25
In response to the initial corporate scandals of this decade, Delaware 
courts began to more narrowly interpret and apply the business judgment 
rule defense,26 which may lead to more shareholder derivative actions 
surviving until trial.  Like Delaware, however, in many states even if a 
shareholder derivative action reaches trial no right to a jury trial exists.  
For instance, in one of the highest profile cases of this decade, In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs survived multiple 
pretrial motions only to lose at trial.27  After a lengthy trial, the trial 
judge ruled that the business judgment rule defense protected the Disney 
directors’ decisions, despite finding that the directors’ conduct fell 
“short of what shareholders expect and demand from those entrusted 
with a fiduciary position” and that their conduct “does not comport with 
(Del. 2006); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000). 
23. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (“The business 
judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory authority to 
manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
872 (Del. 1985) (stating the business judgment rule “protect[s] and promote[s] the full and free exercise 
of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors”), superseded by statute as stated in Emerald 
Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
24. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding 
after a lengthy trial, that the defendants were entitled to business judgment rule protection), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); In re BHC Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., 789 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[I]t is 
a bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails to 
contain allegations of fact that, if true, would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule, that 
claim should ordinarily be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).”); Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of Cal., 
Civ. A. No. 5915, 1983 WL 20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (noting that to defeat a summary 
judgment motion, a plaintiff can “allude to facts in the record which are undisputed or which are 
disputed but, if true, are sufficient to rebut the presumption” of the business judgment rule). 
25. See Fairfax, supra note 17, at 409 (“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant to board 
decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious examples of director 
misconduct.”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical strong protection of corporate boards”). 
26. See Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: 
The Delaware Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 589 (2008). 
27. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re 
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 15452, 2004 WL 2050138, at *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 
2004).  The trial occurred between October 2004 and January 2005.  In re The Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 697. 
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how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act.”28  Thus, 
in the end, the Disney plaintiffs’ fate was the same as always—defeated 
by a judge’s decision to protect directors from liability for their 
misconduct. 
As described in the next subpart, the recent financial collapse has 
revealed corporate scandals that are generating shareholder derivative 
litigation—similar to the prior scandals of this decade.  If such litigation 
is filed in states which, like Delaware, do not permit jury trials, then it 
may meet the same fate as the Disney case. 
A. Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Credit Crunch, and Stock Market 
Collapse 
The compensation system for corporate executives contributed to the 
subprime mortgage crisis, credit crunch, and stock market collapse.  
Corporate executives often receive bonuses based not on their 
performance, “but on risky, short-term moves that look good on paper 
and pump up stock prices.”29  Corporations created this bonus system to 
attract high quality officers and directors: 
In theory, the chance at a fat bonus attracts top-flight financiers and 
motivates them to work hard.  But by pegging bonuses to short-term 
returns, with no provisions for clawing back those bonuses if profits turn 
to losses, Wall Street devised a way to reward itself for taking great risk, 
exposing everyone else to danger.  This is not only unfair to shareholders 
and taxpayers, it also undermined the economy.30
By rewarding directors and officers for short-term profits, the current 
executive compensation system has become a means by which corporate 
executives enrich themselves while swindling shareholders. 
For instance, the scandals within the recent financial collapse 
originated with Wall Street investment banks bundling trillions of 
dollars worth of mortgages into various forms of mortgage-backed 
28. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 763; see id. at 697 (finding that the 
Disney directors did not comply with “best practices of ideal corporate governance”). 
 29. Editorial, Scraping by on Half a Mil, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2009, at A14; see also Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Putting a Value on a C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2008, at B1 (“What has caused the most 
outrage is the difference between pay and actual performance . . . .”); David Greising, Tide Seems to be 
Turning on Big Corporate Paydays, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 6, 2009, at C27 (“Never before has Wall 
Street’s star system seemed so tarnished.  Merrill Lynch’s John Thain gets a package worth up to $87 
million in 2007, and what happens next? A shotgun merger with Bank of America late last year, 
arranged to avert an outright collapse.  Goldman Sachs’ Lloyd Blankfein nabs $69 million in 2007, and, 
before you know it, he needs Warren Buffett to bail out his firm with a $5 billion rescue package.”). 
 30. Op-Ed., With New Pay Rules, Bankers Get What They Deserve, supra note 1, at 12A. 
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securities, mortgage-backed bonds, and collateralized debt obligations.31
Wall Street investment banks then sold those products to investors,32
which helped fuel the surge in housing sales.33  In creating these 
mortgage-backed securities, however, Wall Street firms relied on 
mathematical risk models that falsely suggested such securities were 
safe.34  They also failed to conduct due diligence on individual 
mortgages within such securities,35 which would have revealed that 
subprime borrowers’ mortgages were lumped together with the 
mortgages of prime borrowers who had good credit histories.36
The massive number of mortgage securitizations is viewed “as a key 
culprit of the housing mess because banks created and then sold billions 
of dollars of securities without conducting due diligence on individual 
loans within the pools.”37  While the financial markets soared, “the 
incentives on Wall Street were to keep chasing profits by trading more 
and more sophisticated securities, piling on more debt and making larger 
and larger bets.”38  But this scheme was unsustainable.  When home 
prices began falling, widespread fears of mortgage defaults (particularly 
defaults on subprime mortgages) crushed the values of these mortgage-
 31. The securitizations of mortgages took several forms including mortgage-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed bonds, and collateralized debt obligations.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s 
Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1111–13 (explaining the 
securitization process and the nomenclature of the mortgage-backed products); see also Jennifer E. 
Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis (Harv. 
Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1096582&rec=1&srcabs=956243 (same); Confessions of a Risk Manager, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2008, at 72 (noting that a collateralized debt obligation is a package of asset-
backed securities).  All of these products are included within this Article’s interchangeable references to 
“mortgage-backed securities” and “mortgage securitizations.” 
 32. Ruth Simon, Investors Hit BofA Loan Modification, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2008, at C1. 
 33. Liz Rappaport & Carrick Mollenkamp, Banks May Keep Skin in the Game, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
10, 2009, at C3. 
34. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1114–15; see also Kristopher Geradi et al., Brookings 
Institute, Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis (Sept. 5, 2008) (draft Brookings Paper on Economic 
Activity), available at  http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ 
ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/2008_fall_bpea_gerardi_sherlund_lehnert_willen.pdf (arguing that 
Wall Street correctly predicted the drop in the real estate prices but assigned too low of a probability to 
that risk); Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models that Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and 
Defaults (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 08-19, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296982 (arguing that the quantitative methods used 
by Wall Street underestimated defaults for subprime borrowers). 
 35. Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3; see also Ruptured Credit, THE ECONOMIST,
May 17, 2008, at 6, 8 (explaining how the proliferation and complexity of these instruments “made it 
even harder to understand the composition and quality of underlying assets”). 
36. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1316–18 
(2009). 
 37. Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3. 
 38. Steve Lohr, Wall Street’s Extreme Sport, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1. 
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backed securities, which then collapsed the markets for such securities.39
A Wall Street Journal article observed that “[t]he financial crisis has 
created losers across the spectrum—homeowners who can’t afford their 
subprime mortgages, banks that loaned to them, investors who bought 
mortgage-backed securities and, as financial markets eventually 
crumbled, just about everyone who owned shares.”40  The steep decline 
of the financial markets alone impacted the approximately 6 in 10 
Americans who have money invested in the stock market.41  Hence, the 
actions of the officers and directors of the corporations in this mortgage 
securitization chain severely harmed the long-term interests of their 
corporations, shareholders, and employees, while they received record 
compensation for their short-term actions. 
The consequences did not end there, however, because Wall Street 
investment banks’ actions led to the credit crunch.  Banks “hobbled by 
these bad investments [in subprime mortgage-backed securities] reined 
in lending, spawning the wider credit crunch as a result.”42  Even small 
banks have failed as result and regulators expect more bank failures as 
bad real-estate loans continue to damage bank balance sheets.43  Some 
economists predict that “banks with huge holdings in subprime 
mortgages and related securities . . . may never recover much of their 
value.”44  Economists also worry about the future of securitization, 
which is a pivotal instrument of modern banking that allows banks to 
bundle all sorts of loans into securities for sale to investors, and thus 
plays a significant role in the credit markets driving the American 
 39. Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target with $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at BU4. 
 40. Tom Lauricella, The Stock Picker’s Defeat, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008, at A1; see also
Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend that Wall Street Died, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A1 (“For the 
U.S. Securities industry to unravel as spectacularly as it did in September, many parties had to pull on 
many threads.  Mortgage bankers gave loans to Americans for homes they couldn’t afford.  Investment 
houses packaged these loans into complex instruments whose risk they didn’t always understand.  
Ratings agencies often gave their seal of approval, investors borrowed heavily to buy, regulators missed 
the warning signs.  But at the center of it all—and paid hundreds of millions of dollars during the boom 
to manage their firms’ risk—were the four bosses of Wall Street.”). 
 41. Public Agenda, http://www.publicagenda.org/charts/six-10-americans-say-they-have-money-
invested-stock-market-nearly-half-say-stock-market-has-no-affect (last visited Jan. 14, 2010); see also 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS 
AND ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf (stating that about 90 million Americans are invested 
in the stock market).
 42. Robin Sidel, Massive Efforts to Save Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2008, at A1. 
 43. Dan Fitzpatrick & Damian Paletta, Three Banks Fail in a Single Day, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 
2008, at C2. 
 44. Ben White, Goldman Sachs Reports a $2.1 Billion Quarterly Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2008, at B4. 
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economy.45  Economists note that “[t]hree decades ago, banks supplied 
$3 out of every $4 worth of credit worldwide. Today, because of 
securitization, that share has dropped to about $1 in $3.”46
The mortgage-backed securities created by Wall Street investment 
banks also led to the creation of credit-default swaps, in which investors 
swapped contracts that insured pools of mortgage-backed securities.47
Insurance companies, such as American International Group, Inc. (AIG), 
began selling insurance on debt securities backed by subprime 
mortgages; such insurance promised buyers “that if the debt securities 
defaulted, AIG would make good on them.”48  Essentially, AIG insured 
security trading parties, including parties trading mortgage-backed 
securities, against any losses in their holdings of securities backed by 
pools of mortgages and other assets.49  AIG’s financial-product unit 
operated more like “a Wall Street trading firm than a conservative 
insurer selling protection against defaults on seemingly low-risk 
securities.”50  The face value of the entire credit-default swap market 
was an estimated $55 trillion and, although intended to spread risk, these 
credit-default swaps actually magnified the financial collapse.51  The 
federal government has twice bailed out AIG because of its enormous 
losses from the mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations that it insured.52
45. See Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, supra note 36, at 1313–15 (explaining the 
importance of securitization). 
 46. Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, Parched for Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B1 
(“Securitization, which works like a shadow banking system, has radically changed banking and the 
credit markets in recent years.”); see also Rappaport & Mollenkamp, supra note 33, at C3 (“The $8.7 
trillion securitization market, which also helped fund credit cards and auto loans, is largely dead . . . .”). 
 47. Lohr, supra note 38, at B1.  A swap occurs between two investors (typically banks or hedge 
funds) and is not traded on an exchange.  Id.  Credit-default swaps were originally created to insure 
blue-chip bond investors against the risk of default.  Id. 
 48. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at A1. 
 49. Serena Ng et al., AIG Faces $10 Billion in Losses on Bad Bets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2008, 
at C1; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central 
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1 (“AIG was a major seller of 
‘credit-default swaps,’ essentially insurance against default on assets tied to corporate debt and mortgage 
securities.”). 
 50. Ng et al., supra note 49, at C1. 
 51. Lohr, supra note 38, at B1 (stating that credit-default swaps “magnified the financial crisis 
because the market is unregulated, obscure and brimming with counterparty risk”); Heard on the Street / 
Financial Analysis and Commentary, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at C8 (stating that AIG’s residential 
portfolio has a face value of at least $88 billion). 
52. See Michael J. de la Merced & Sharon Otterman, A.I.G. Takes Its Session in Hot Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1; see also Matthew Karnitschnig et al., AIG Faces Cash Crisis as Stock Dives 
61%, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1 (“AIG’s business selling credit protection against the 
possibility of default in a variety of assets, including subprime mortgages, set it apart from most other 
insurers and tied it more closely to the fate of the housing and credit markets.”); Annelena Lobb, Few 
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Numerous instances of mismanagement and looting by corporate 
executives were uncovered as the dominoes fell during the recent 
financial collapse, and they are already generating litigation.53  Citigroup 
shareholders have filed a derivative action in federal court in the 
Southern District of New York, alleging that Citigroup executives 
recklessly purchased billions of dollars in subprime loans for 
securitization despite the apparent subprime mortgage crisis.54  A similar 
action is pending against Citigroup in the Delaware Chancery Court.55
AIG shareholders have also filed a similar derivative action in the 
Delaware Chancery Court.56  Shareholders in Merrill Lynch have also 
filed a derivative action attempting to recoup the monetary losses 
suffered by the corporation from its aggressive investment in 
collateralized debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities, but their 
case was dismissed because the shareholders lacked standing following 
Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch.57  Now virtually 
identical actions are pending against Bank of America in both the 
Delaware Chancery Court and the federal court in the Southern District 
of New York.58  As the next section demonstrates, the plaintiffs in the 
derivative actions pending in federal court will possess a right to jury 
trial, but the other litigants will not because Delaware, like most states, 
Bright Lights Amid the Gloom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R2 (stating that AIG’s billions of dollars in 
losses stemmed “mainly from problems in a unit that sold a form of insurance against credit defaults”). 
 53. Numerous class actions alleging securities fraud have also been filed.  See CORNERSTONE 
RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2008 A YEAR IN REVIEW 4 (2009), 
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.pdf (stating that 210 federal securities class actions were 
filed in 2008 and that 90% of the class actions filed against financial companies were related to the 
subprime mortgage crisis); Bethel et al., supra note 31, at 2.  These actions possess a right to jury trial, 
and thus are not discussed in this article. 
 54. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste of 
Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment and Violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Nathanson 
v. Prince, No. 107CV10333, 2007 WL 5042954 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007). 
 55. Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint, In re Citigroup, Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., No. 3338-CC, 2008 WL 3910741 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2008). 
 56. Verified Double Derivative Complaint, Fulco v. Cassano, No. 4290, 2009 WL 111395 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 15, 2009). 
57. In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 597 F.Supp. 2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing derivative 
actions on grounds that under Delaware law shareholders lacked standing to bring derivative suits on 
behalf of Merrill Lynch because they no longer owned stock in Merrill Lynch after its merger with Bank 
of America in a stock-for-stock transaction). 
 58. Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Siegel v. Lewis, No. 09 CV 1331, 2009 WL 
455225 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Hollywood Police 
Officers Ret. Sys. v. Lewis, No. '09 CV 01174, 2009 WL 365121 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 09, 2009); Verified 
Class and Derivative Action Complaint, Houx v. Lewis, No. 4389, 2009 WL 497059 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 
2009); Verified Derivative Complaint, Kovacs v. Lewis, No. 4356-VCS, 2009 WL 357482 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 10, 2009); Verified Derivative Complaint, Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Lewis, No. 4310, 2009 WL 
207904 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2009); Derivative Complaint, Rothbaum v. Lewis, No. 4307, 2009 WL 
166390 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2009). 
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denies any right to a jury trial for shareholder derivative actions.
B. The Right to a Jury Trial in Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
Shareholders pursuing a derivative action have a number of 
considerations in choosing a forum in which to file their action.  
Shareholders can always bring a derivative action in the state in which 
the corporation is incorporated.  They can also file in any state in which 
the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction.  Thus shareholders 
can file a derivative claim on behalf of many large public corporations in 
numerous states.  Shareholders may also file derivative actions in federal 
court if the claim is based on a federal question59 or if diversity 
jurisdiction exists,60 which requires that all plaintiff-shareholders be 
citizens of states other than the home states of the defendants.61  Each 
potential forum offers different perceived advantages and disadvantages.  
In some forums, one of the advantages is the right to a jury trial. 
1. The Law of the Forum Court Governs the Right to Jury Trial 
The law of the forum where the shareholder derivative lawsuit is filed 
determines whether a right to a jury trial exists.  When a lawsuit is filed 
in federal court under either federal question jurisdiction or diversity 
jurisdiction, the federal court applies its own rules of practice and 
procedure.62  Thus, regardless of the substantive law that will govern the 
merits of the case, a federal court will apply federal provisions to decide 
whether a right to a jury trial exists in a lawsuit.63  Similarly, in state 
courts, the law of the forum state governs the conduct of the court 
proceedings and the rules of practice.64  The weight of judicial authority 
holds that the method of trying a case, including whether there is a right 
to a jury trial, is a matter of procedure.65  Thus, regardless of which 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
60. Id. § 1332(a). 
61. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005) (“The 
complete diversity requirement is not mandated by the Constitution, or by the plain text of § 1332(a).  
The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of the diversity 
requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, 
or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.  The presence of parties from the same State on both 
sides of a case dispels this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over 
any of the claims in the action.”) (citation omitted). 
62. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 63. Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 259 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1966). 
64. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflicts of Law § 148 (1998); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 53 N.W.2d 740 (Wis. 
1952). 
 65. ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 122, at 242 (3d ed. 1977). 
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state’s substantive law applies66 and whether a shareholder would be 
entitled to a jury trial in federal court, a state court may not recognize a 
right to a jury trial.67
This view is consistent with the First and Second Restatements of 
Conflicts.  The First Restatement of Conflicts states that “[t]he law of the 
forum governs all matters of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in 
court”68 and that “[t]he law of the forum determines whether an issue of 
fact shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”69  Similarly, the Second 
Restatement of Conflicts states that “[t]he local law of the forum governs 
rules of pleading and the conduct of proceedings in court”70 and 
specifically that “[t]he local law of the forum determines whether an 
issue shall be tried by the court or by a jury.”71  Thus, the forum state 
may apply its own procedural rules to decide whether a shareholder 
derivative action has a right to a jury trial. 
Other procedural rules of the forum court will also apply in 
shareholder derivative lawsuits.  For instance, many states and the 
federal courts have enacted special pleading standards for derivative 
actions, which require the plaintiffs to plead either that they made a 
demand on the board of directors or the reasons why such a demand is 
excused.72  Although the forum court’s procedural rules apply, the 
substantive law of the corporation’s state of incorporation applies to the 
merits pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine adopted by every state.73
66. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 
949, 961 (Kan. 1992). 
 67. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 592 (1934). 
69. Id. § 594. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127 (1971). 
71. Id. § 129. 
72. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
 73. Shareholder derivative suits challenge the directors’ decisions, and thus involve judicial 
review of the corporation’s internal affairs.  All states have recognized the “internal affairs doctrine,” 
which provides that the law of the state where the corporation is incorporated governs the internal affairs 
of the corporation.  See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 
(Del. 2005) (stating that under the internal affairs doctrine, state law governs those matters “that pertain 
to the relationships among or between the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders”); see 
also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983) (“As a 
general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally determines issues relating to the internal 
affairs of a corporation. Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and 
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests in the 
corporation. . . . Different conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third parties external 
to the corporation are at issue.”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (“The internal affairs 
doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the authority to 
regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a corporation could 
be faced with conflicting demands.”). 
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2. The Right to Jury Trial in Federal Courts 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution as protecting the jury trial rights that existed when that 
amendment was adopted in 1791.  The Seventh Amendment states that 
“[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”74  The 
colonial courts formed before the American Revolution were patterned 
on the English judicial system, which had two court systems: courts of 
common law and courts of chancery.  In the common law courts, a jury 
trial was widely available for most of the legal claims commonly in use 
by the eighteenth century.  In the chancery courts, the chancellor 
administered a variety of equitable remedies without a jury.  The framers 
of the Seventh Amendment struck a compromise that preserved the right 
of trial by jury for those cases that were historically brought in the courts 
of common law.75  The Seventh Amendment did not extend any right to 
jury trial to those cases that were historically relegated to the courts of 
chancery.  In other words, a right of trial by jury exists for the legal 
claims historically pursued in the common law courts, but not for the 
equitable claims historically pursued in the chancery courts. 
Consistent with the language of the Seventh Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a historical test for determining whether a 
right to a jury trial exists in a particular case that analyzes whether the 
particular claim would have been within the jurisdiction of the common 
law courts of 1791 when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.76  For 
most claims, well-established historical patterns easily solve the 
question of the right to trial by jury.  Claims created after 1791, such as 
those created by statute, are more complicated.  For such claims, the 
Supreme Court requires federal courts to examine the nature of the 
claims and remedies sought: “First, we compare the statutory action to 
18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger 
of the courts of law and equity.  Second, we examine the remedy sought 
and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”77  The Supreme 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.  The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated into 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment 
to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 38(a). 
75. See generally HEBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 18–19 (1981) (discussing the adoption 
of the Seventh Amendment); Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh 
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 668–705 (1973) (same). 
 76. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1990); see 
also DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1963).
 77. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted). 
142 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
Court has stated that the second inquiry is more important in 
determining whether a right to trial by jury exists.78
When the Seventh Amendment was adopted in 1791, the chancery 
courts heard the claims of plaintiffs seeking injunctive or other relief 
available only in equity.79  The chancery courts also heard the claims of 
plaintiffs who wanted to use a procedural device available only in 
equity, such as a derivative or class action.80  Because courts of common 
law in 1791 did not allow shareholders to sue on behalf of the 
corporation, shareholders were forced to turn to the chancery courts to 
pursue a derivative suit “to enforce a corporate cause of action against 
officers, directors, and third parties.”81  Consequently, shareholder 
derivative actions were historically equitable, regardless of whether the 
claims asserted in the actions were legal or equitable.82
In the 1970 Ross v. Bernhard decision, the U. S. Supreme Court 
reversed a Second Circuit decision that had held that the Seventh 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial did not extend to shareholder 
derivative actions.83  The Supreme Court interpreted the Seventh 
Amendment’s preservation of the right to a jury trial as including “not 
merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and 
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained 
and determined” and thus that the Seventh Amendment “embrace[d] all 
suits, which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may 
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.”84
The Supreme Court noted that despite the difficulty defining the line 
between actions in law and equity, some actions were clearly at law: 
Whether the corporation was viewed as an entity separate from its 
stockholders or as a device permitting its stockholders to carry on their 
business and to sue and be sued, a corporation’s suit to enforce a legal 
right was an action at common law carrying the right to jury trial at the 
time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.85
In 1791, shareholder derivative suits were required to show that the 
corporation had a valid claim but refused to sue after the shareholders 
78. Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 565; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 47–48 (1989). 
79. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2302 (3d ed. 1998). 
 80. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 (1970) (noting that “the derivative suit and the class 
action were both ways of allowing parties to be heard in equity who could not speak at law.”). 
81. Id. at 534. 
82. Id.
83. Id. at 532. 
84. Id. at 533 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S (3 Pet.) 433, 447 
(1830)). 
85. Id. at 533–34 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *475). 
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made a suitable demand.86  The Supreme Court thus interpreted these 
two preconditions as forming the: 
dual aspects [of the derivative suit]: first, the stockholder’s right to sue on 
behalf of the corporation, historically an equitable matter; second, the 
claim of the corporation against directors or third parties on which, if the 
corporation had sued and the claim presented legal issues, the company 
could demand a jury trial.87
The Court then explained that: 
[L]egal claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by their 
presentation to a court of equity in a derivative suit.  The claim pressed by 
the stockholder against directors or third parties “is not his own but the 
corporation’s.” . . . The proceeds of the action belong to the corporation 
and it is bound by the result of the suit.  The heart of the action is the 
corporate claim.  If it presents a legal issue, one entitling the corporation 
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury is not 
forfeited merely because the stockholder’s right to sue must first be 
adjudicated as an equitable issue triable to the court. 88
Thus, the Court held that the merger of law and equity meant that in a 
shareholder’s derivative suit, the judge must preliminarily decide if the 
shareholders’ derivative suit could proceed to trial, but a jury was 
required to hear any legal claims asserted on behalf of the corporation. 
The Supreme Court stated that this holding was required by its prior 
decisions in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover89 and Dairy Queen, Inc. 
v. Wood90 in which it had held that the right to a jury trial is preserved 
even when legal and equitable claims are joined in the same case.91  In 
such a case, “there is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must 
not be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the 
equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing between the 
claims.”92  The Court thought the same principle determinative of the 
question in derivative actions, because “[t]he Seventh Amendment 
question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the 
character of the overall action.”93  Thus, if the shareholder has a right to 
sue on behalf of the corporation,94 the court examines the claim as if the 
86. Id.
87. Id. at 538. 
88. Id. at 538–39 (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947)). 
 89. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
 90. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
91. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538. 
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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corporation was the entity asserting it.95  If the claim is one that 
historically entitled the corporation to a jury trial, the shareholder 
bringing the claim derivatively has a right to a jury trial.96
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) rejected 
the historical distinction between law and equity and merged the two 
such that one action may join all claims and remedies.97  The FRCP thus 
destroyed “[p]urely procedural impediments to the presentation of any 
issue by any party, based on the difference between law and equity.”98
Because law and equity are combined under the FRCP, “nothing turns 
now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which the 
parties happen to come before the court.”99  Thus, “it is no longer 
tenable for a district court, administering both law and equity in the 
same action, to deny legal remedies to a corporation, merely because the 
corporation’s spokesmen are its shareholders rather than its  
directors.”100
To support its conclusion that shareholder derivative actions 
presenting legal claims possess a right to jury trial, the Supreme Court 
noted that historically “the derivative suit and the class action were both 
ways of allowing parties to be heard in equity who could not speak at 
law,” but that a class action now may obtain a jury trial on any legal 
claims asserted by the class.101  “After adoption of the rules there is no 
longer any procedural obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before 
juries, however the party may have acquired standing to assert those 
rights.”102  The Supreme Court concluded that: 
[g]iven the availability in a derivative action of both legal and equitable 
remedies, we think the Seventh Amendment preserves to the parties in a 
stockholder’s suit the same right to a jury trial that historically belonged 
to the corporation and to those against whom the corporation pressed its 
legal claims.103
95. Id.
96. Id. at 542. 
97. Id. at 539. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 2, and 18, the same court may try both 
legal and equitable causes in the same action.  Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 
(1959).  “As pointed out in Beacon, legal and equitable issues can be tried at the same time, the jury (if 
one has been demanded), rendering a verdict on the legal issues, and the court rendering a decision on 
the equitable issues.”  DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1963). 
98. Ross, 396 U.S. at 539–40. 
99. Id. at 540. 
100. Id.
101. Id. at 541. 
102. Id. at 542. 
103. Id.  But see id. at 550–51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision was 
not justified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Constitution, but “can perhaps be explained 
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In sum, the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment applies 
to the traditionally equitable shareholder’s derivative suit when the 
underlying claims present legal issues.  For derivative actions filed in 
federal court, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard held that “the right 
to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the 
corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have been 
entitled to a jury.”104  The right to a jury trial does not depend on the 
character of the suit but on the nature of the issues involved within the 
“ancient distinction between law and equity.”105
Courts look to the true basis of the action to distinguish between legal 
and equitable claims.106  For example, federal courts allow a jury trial 
when the claim alleges tortious misappropriation of trade information,107
conspiracy to defraud,108 fraudulent transactions,109 wrongful 
appropriation,110 or where a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty is 
predicated on underlying conduct such as negligence which, in a direct 
suit, would allow a jury trial at common law.111  Even a claim that is 
solely for breach of fiduciary duty carries a right to a jury trial when the 
remedy sought is monetary damages.112  When a claim is equitable, 
however, such as one seeking an injunction, courts do not allow a jury 
trial.  Thus, a plaintiff in a derivative action generally possesses a right 
to a jury trial if the principal relief sought is a monetary judgment rather 
than an equitable remedy. 
Most circuit courts have concluded that the Supreme Court did not 
announce a new procedural rule in Ross v. Bernhard, but rather resolved 
a circuit conflict in articulating a rule consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s prior interpretation of the procedure.113  A few circuit and 
district courts, however, have ruled that highly complex cases such as 
shareholder derivative suits are an exception to the Seventh 
as a reflection of an unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor of jury trials in civil 
actions.”). 
104. Id. at 532–33 (majority opinion).  However, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
failure of a party to serve a demand for a jury trial constitutes a waiver of that right.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
38(b) & (d). 
 105. Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 422 (9th Cir. 1979). 
106. Id. at 423 (citing Ross, 396 U.S. 531); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
 107. Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1970). 
 108. Nat’l Union Elec. Corp. v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 986, 987–88 (6th Cir. 1970). 
 109. Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100, 109 (8th Cir. 1967). 
 110. Robine v. Ryan, 310 F.2d 797, 798 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 111. DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 836–37 (9th Cir. 1963). 
112. In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1985); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 384 (1st 
Cir. 1971); Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189, 196 (D. Del. 1970). 
 113. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 20–21 (7th Cir. 1972); see also DePinto, 323 F.2d 
at 835–36 (creating a holding similar to Ross v. Bernhard). 
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Amendment.114  These cases often argue that a footnote in Ross v. 
Bernhard allows for such an exception to the Seventh Amendment.115
That footnote stated that “the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by 
considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such 
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities 
and limitations of juries.”116  Refusing to apply this rationale in rejecting 
a jury claim, the Ninth Circuit determined that “[a]fter employing an 
historical test for almost two hundred years, it is doubtful that the 
Supreme Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its 
prior interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote.”117  Most 
circuit courts have rejected the complexity exception to the Seventh 
Amendment118 and the Supreme Court, in considering Seventh 
Amendment questions since Ross v. Bernhard, has never considered 
juries’ abilities in determining whether a right to trial by jury exists.119
3. The Right to Jury Trial in State Courts 
The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not 
apply to the states.120  Therefore, Ross v. Bernhard does not bind state 
courts.  Whether a shareholder derivative suit filed in state court has a 
right to a jury trial depends on each state’s law. 
A few states have adopted the Ross v. Bernhard approach or reached 
the same approach based on interpretations of their own constitutions.121
For instance, New Mexico and Wyoming have explicitly adopted the 
 114. Cotton v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); Kian v. 
Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Secs. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); see also
George K. Chamberlin, Complexity of Civil Actions as Affecting Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by 
Jury, 54 A.L.R. FED. 733 (1981). 
115. See Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979); 
see also Scott v. Woods, 730 P.2d 480 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). 
 116. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (emphasis added) (citing Fleming James, 
Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963)).
117. Fabrikant, 609 F.2d at 425. 
 118. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Fabrikant, 609 F.2d 
411. 
119. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 
(1974); Curtis v. Lothether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
 120. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 220 (1916). 
 121. Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: 
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 616 n.130 (1994); Jean E. Maess, Right to Jury Trial 
in Shareholder’s Derivative Action, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1111 (2008); 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5990.10 (2009); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:18 (2008). 
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Ross v. Bernhard approach and allow jury trials where shareholder 
derivative suits raise legal claims.122  New York also follows Ross v. 
Bernhard, stating that if the claim is legal when brought by the 
corporation, then there is a right to a jury trial because “legal claims are 
not magically converted into equitable issues by their presentation to a 
court of equity in a derivative suit.”123  Similarly, Alabama and 
Maryland follow the Ross v. Bernhard approach in extending the right to 
jury trial in shareholder derivative actions, but do so based on 
interpretations of their own constitutions.124
By contrast, most states refuse to approach derivative suits like Ross
v. Bernhard and hold that no right to a jury trial exists in shareholder 
derivative actions because such actions were historically filed in equity 
courts which did not have jury trials.125  For instance, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that its state constitution mandates that the “right of 
jury trial shall be preserved only in those cases in which the parties were 
entitled to it under the law or practice existing at the time of the adoption 
of the Constitution” and thus no jury trial is allowed in shareholder 
derivative suits.126  California courts have also rejected Ross v. Bernhard
and held that no right to a jury trial exists in derivative actions, declining 
to depart from the “historically based approach” to interpreting their 
state constitution.127  Although Florida courts have adopted a flexible 
approach for deciding whether to allow jury trials in most cases, they 
have declined to adopt Ross v. Bernhard and have relied on the 
historically equitable nature of derivative action to deny any right to a 
jury trial in shareholder derivative suits.128
Thus, even though these states have merged law and equity to allow 
one lawsuit to present both legal and equitable claims, they continue to 
deny any right to a jury trial for shareholder derivative actions.  A few 
states, however, have not merged law and equity.129  Delaware is the 
122. Scott v. Woods, 730 P.2d 480, 486 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Hyatt Bros., Inc. ex rel. Hyatt v. 
Hyatt, 769 P.2d 329, 335 (Wyo. 1989).
 123. Fedoryszyn v. Weiss, 310 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970). 
 124. Fin., Inv. & Rediscount Co. v. Wells, 409 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Ala. 1982); Hashem v. Taheri,
571 A.2d 837, 840 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). 
 125. Maess, supra note 121; DEMOTT, supra note 121, § 4:18. 
 126. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 1978). 
 127. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
 128. Lanman Lithotech, Inc. v. Gurwitz, 478 So.2d 425, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 129. Arkansas traditionally followed the historical analysis to deny a right to jury trial in 
shareholder derivative actions.  Hames v. Cravens, 966 S.W.2d 244, 246–48 (Ark. 1998) (holding that 
the form of the action is dispositive and thus the equitable nature of a derivative suit excludes any right 
to a jury trial).  But such actions may now possess a right to a jury trial after Arkansas voters agreed to 
merge the courts of law and equity in November 2000.  See 2 DAVID NEWBERN & JOHN J. WATKINS, 
ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 29:3 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that law and equity are 
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most notable example because it is the state leader in corporate law.130
In Delaware, all shareholder derivative suits must be filed in the Court 
of Chancery, which sits without juries.131
Iowa, on the other hand, denies jury trials in shareholder actions 
because it would create “quite a quandary for the lower courts” to decide 
which of the shareholders’ claims are legal or equitable under state 
law.132  The Iowa Supreme Court also thought shareholder derivative 
litigation too complicated for a jury to properly decide because such 
cases typically involve multiple parties and require consideration of 
complex issues such as fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule, and 
the functioning of a large corporation.133  Likewise, it expressed 
reservations about the fairness of a result in a jury trial due to the jury’s 
lack of specialized knowledge and ability to evaluate the testimony.134
So to preserve the due process right to a fair trial, the Iowa Supreme 
Court deemed judges better equipped to decide these complex claims.135
In sum, a few states allow jury trial of legal claims in shareholder 
derivative actions consistent with the Ross v. Bernhard approach, but 
most do not.  Most states deny any right to a jury trial in shareholder 
derivative actions because of the historically equitable nature of such 
actions.  Criticism and mistrust of juries has also played a role in the 
decisions to prohibit any right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative 
suits. 
merged); Walker v. First Commercial Bank, 880 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Ark. 1994) (stating that procedural 
rules will not be applied to diminish the right to a trial by jury); Charles D. McDaniel, Jr., First National 
Bank of Dewitt v. Cruthis: An Analysis of the Right to a Jury Trial in Arkansas after the Merger of Law 
and Equity, 60 ARK. L. REV. 563, 563 (2007). 
130. See, e.g., Mullen v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts of 
other states commonly look to Delaware law . . . for aid in fashioning rules of corporate law.”); Arons, 
supra note 21, at 130 (“[M]ost states look towards Delaware’s corporate law decisions for guidance in 
their own holdings . . . .”). 
131. See Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950 (Del. 1992) , overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. 
Ch. 1987); Snyder v. Butcher & Co., C.A. No. 91C-04-0289, 1992 WL 240344 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 
15, 1992). 
 132. Weltzin v. Nail, 618 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 
550 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are, for the most part, no such things as inherently ‘legal 
issues’ or inherently ‘equitable issues.’  There are only factual issues, and, ‘like chameleons (they) take 
their color from surrounding circumstances.’  Thus the Court’s ‘nature of the issue’ approach is hardly 
meaningful.”). 
133. Weltzin, 618 N.W.2d at 302. 
134. Id.
135. Id. at 301.
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III. REFUTING THE CRITICISMS AGAINST CIVIL JURY TRIALS GENERALLY
Civil juries have long been criticized by lawyers, commentators, and 
even judges.  Such criticisms, however, were not systematically tested 
until the past fifty years.  Empirical research undermines much of the 
criticisms of civil juries and jury trials.  Subpart A summarizes the 
typical criticisms directed toward civil juries and jury trials.  Subpart B 
then explains the empirical research that challenges such criticisms. 
A. Criticisms of Civil Juries and Jury Trials 
Criticizing juries and jury trials is not a new phenomenon.  A 
commentator in 1905 stated that the civil jury was a “clog upon 
justice.”136  Noted American author Mark Twain once said: “The jury 
system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon 
ignorance, stupidity, and perjury.  It is a shame that we must continue to 
use a worthless system because it was good a thousand years ago.”137
Even judges have occasionally criticized juries.  Chief Justice Warren 
Burger opined that “civil juries waste time and often are incapable of 
understanding issues presented to them.”138  More recently, Judge 
Posner has questioned the ability of jurors, stating “I think it is 
romanticizing . . . to suppose that average people are deep wells of 
wisdom with a pumping station in every jury room.”139  Criticisms of 
civil juries largely fall into two categories: (1) criticisms of civil juries’ 
performance and civil jury trials generally, and (2) criticisms of juries’ 
damage awards. 
1. Criticisms of Civil Juries’ Performance and Civil Jury Trials 
Generally 
Critics often argue that jurors are ill-equipped for their 
decisionmaking responsibilities.  They describe juries as incompetent, 
illogical, and irrational.140  Further, critics claim that juries are 
 136. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—The 
Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CINN. L. REV. 15, 17 (1990) (citing G. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL 
VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS BY JURIES 9 (1905)). 
 137. 2 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 76 (1913). 
 138. Brodin, supra note 136, at 18 (citing Suits Too Complex for a Jury, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 22, 
1980, at 118); see also Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210–11 
(1985) (stating that juries are not comprised of peopled trained to decide complex litigation). 
 139. Richard A. Posner, Juries on Trial, 99 COMMENTARY 49, 51 (1995). 
 140. Brian H. Bornstein & Timothy R. Robicheaux, Crisis, What Crisis? Perception and Reality 
in Civil Justice, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 2
(Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008); Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of 
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“arbitrary, unpredictable, and subject to passion.”141  Similarly, they 
argue that jurors are biased in favor of plaintiffs142 and tend to make 
decisions based on experiences, stereotypes, and personal beliefs.143
Lawyers similarly criticize jury decisionmaking.  When there is a 
choice, parties often decide between a judge or jury trial based on the 
lawyer’s attitude towards the jury.  Stereotypical views may lead 
lawyers to act unwisely in choosing between judge and jury trials.144
One corporate general counsel argued that a jury’s judgment is 
frequently not based on the law and facts: “Oh, a plaintiff’s lawyer can 
get [jurors] all riled up on emotion.  It’s got nothing to do with law.  It’s 
got nothing to do with real liability.  It’s got nothing to do with real 
facts.  It’s got to do with who’s the better actor.”145  Another lawyer 
suggests that the “jury system is a bizarre lottery, lacking predictability 
and consistency in who wins.”146  Other lawyers believe that jurors 
“focus on something that is more akin to ‘L.A. Law’ than is true in a 
courtroom context because that’s what they’ve been schooled in terms of 
what a courtroom is.”147  However, “[d]espite the central importance of 
lawyers’ perceptions of the jury to the civil litigation system, there is 
little systematic information about their views.”148
Legal scholars have offered various arguments for reducing the role 
of juries in civil litigation and some even urge the complete abolition of 
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 699 (2001) (contending 
that jurors rarely pay complete attention and do not make decisions in the manner intended by courts, 
regardless of how they are instructed). 
 141. CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 70 (1962); see also James E. Byrne, 
Revised UCC Section 5-108(e): A Constitutional Nudge to Courts, 29 UCC L.J. 419 (1997); Stephen 
Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, 
and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 269 (1989); Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward 
the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 248, 268–69 
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Margaret L. Moses, The Jury-Trial Right in the UCC: On a Slippery Slope, 
54 SMU L. REV. 561, 593–94 (2001). 
 142. Daniels, supra note 141, at 269; Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: 
A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 506 (1975) (stating 
that juror bias and incompetence are “very real problems”). 
 143. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 
145 (2002) (“Lawyers entertain longstanding perceptions of juries as biased and incompetent, relative to 
judges.”); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 191 (Transaction Publishers 2009) 
(1930) (“Proclaiming that we have a government of laws, we have, in jury cases, created a government 
of often ignorant and prejudiced men.”). 
 144. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 144. 
 145. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’ 
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (alteration in original). 
 146. Daniels, supra note 141, at 280. 
 147. Lande, supra note 145, at 33. 
 148. Hans, supra note 141, at 274. 
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civil juries.149  Scholars criticize jury trials as an inefficient use of 
judicial resources.150  Some critics charge that jury trials cause court 
congestion because “it takes time to select a jury, because lawyers spend 
more time trying a case before a jury, and because it takes some time to 
instruct the jury and for the jury to deliberate.”151  Commentators also 
argue that jury trials take more time than bench trials.152  Some 
commentators have gone so far as to contend that the failings of the civil 
jury have created a crisis in the American legal system.153
Legal scholars and practicing attorneys highlight complex cases as the 
area of most concern with civil juries.  Indeed, “[s]ome of the most 
vociferous criticisms of the jury relate to its performance in cases 
involving business and corporate wrongdoing.”154  Some scholars 
contend that juries are “less sympathetic to large business interests”155
and “less likely to understand complex issues.”156  The American Bar 
Association, after observing alternate jurors in deliberations of complex 
cases, noted that “many jurors were confused, misunderstood the 
 149. ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 14–15 (2001); see also JEROME FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 124–25 (1949); Peter Huber, Junk 
Science and the Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 273, 302; Burger, supra note 138, 215–16; Steven D. 
Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 259 (1997). 
 150. Moses, supra note 141, at 593–94; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Restructuring the 
Traditional Civil Jury: The Effects of Changes in Composition and Procedures, in VERDICT: ASSESSING 
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 414, 417 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 151. JOINER, supra note 141, at 71. 
152. Id.; Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Non-
Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
407, 410 n.15 (“It has been suggested on occasion that use of the civil jury trial adds significant time-
consuming burdens and expenses to the judicial process.”). In 1988, the National Center for State 
Courts conducted a study of nine courts in three states and found that “jury trials last considerably 
longer than nonjury trials.”  DALE A. SIPES ET AL., NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE 
LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 8–9 (1988) (reporting the median length for a civil jury was 
thirteen hours thirty minutes, as opposed to four hours fifty-five minutes for a civil non-jury trial). 
153. See Daniels, supra note 141, at 270, 277; see also Bornstein & Robicheaux, supra note 140, 
at 1 (“There is clearly a perception that the civil justice system is, if not broken, in a serious state of 
disrepair . . .  and although the jury is not painted as the sole culprit, it is portrayed as a leading one.”); 
Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 327, 327 (1998) (“Claims that the jury engages in undeservedly negative treatment of the 
business corporation have been central to heated debate over the role of the jury and its place in an 
alleged litigation crisis.”). 
 154. Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 177 (1989). 
 155. Moses, supra note 141, at 592; see also Sandra Schnitzer Stern, Revised Article 5 Brings 
Uniformity, Predictability to Letters of Credit, 143 N.J. J.L., Feb. 26, 1996, at 803. 
 156. Moses, supra note 141, at 592; see also Casper, supra note 150, at 416–19, Hans, supra note 
141, at 177 (“Critics question the jury’s fact-finding ability in cases with business and corporate parties, 
and doubt whether lay jurors can understand the often complex and esoteric evidence of business 
wrongdoing.”). 
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instructions, failed to recall evidence, and suffered enormously from 
boredom and frustration.”157
Corporate executives also want to avoid juries because the issues are 
too complex for jurors to handle.  One corporate executive stated: “Is it 
any surprise that many commercial contracts these days have a clause 
where each party waives its right to a trial by jury?  Doesn’t that tell you 
something?  That they are not willing to trust twelve peers off the street 
with the complexity of their business transaction.”158  Even corporate 
attorneys avoid civil juries: “I started out as a plaintiff’s trial attorney 
with a strong belief in the jury system . . . . I don’t believe that anymore.  
I think the system is broken.  I think it behooves you to do anything 
possible to avoid it.”159  In one study, 75% of business executives, 73% 
of inside counsel, and 60% of outside counsel believed that juries judge 
businesses more harshly than individuals.160  In a 1992 Business Week
survey of 400 senior executives, 83% reported that “their decisions are 
increasingly affected by the fear of lawsuits.”161  In that same survey, 
85% of those executives blamed the high cost of litigation on 
“[c]ontingency fees that enable people to sue without any financial risk” 
and 79% blamed “[j]uries that hand out awards that are too high.”162  In 
that same survey, 62% of executives also stated that “the U.S. civil 
justice system significantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to 
compete with Japanese and European companies.”163
2. Criticisms of Juries’ Damage Awards 
Lawyers frequently express discontent over juries’ damage awards.164
Critics argue that juries are “overgenerous in their verdicts.”165  Or, as 
 157. SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, JURY COMPREHENSION 
IN COMPLEX CASES 4 (1989). 
 158. Lande, supra note 145, at 34. 
159. Id. at 32. 
160. Id. at 34. 
 161. Mark N. Vamos, The Verdict from the Corner Office, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 66. 
162. Id.; see also Archer W. Huneycutt & Elizabeth A. Wibker, Liability Crisis: Small Businesses 
at Risk, 26 J. SM. BUS. MGMT, Jan. 1988, at 25, 25–28. In a study of 288 small business owners in 
Louisiana, 68% “stated that they had made substantial changes in the way they operate their businesses 
as a result of the liability crisis,” 69% stated that jury awards had little relationship to the actual injury, 
and 58% stated that juries award damages based on sympathy rather than actual fault. Id. at 27.
 163. Vamos, supra note 161, at 66. 
 164. JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 169 (1988) (“The thesis that juries are more 
generous than judges is one of such long standing that it seems almost an article of faith in the legal 
community and among the public. Documentation for it, however, is scant and ambiguous.”). 
 165. Daniels, supra note 141, at 269; Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The 
Jury as Scapegoat, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2005) (stating that in the alleged medical 
malpractice crisis, “the civil jury is often identified as the culprit” and accused of awarding “excessive 
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one critics put it, “[t[he size of the award [is where] the jury has gone 
nuts.”166  Similarly, some critics believe that juries are “more likely to 
make awards based on the deep pocket of the defendant.”167  Other 
critics contend that jury awards are more like lotteries.  One lawyer 
called the civil jury system “a bizarre lottery, lacking predictability and 
consistency in who wins and how much winners are awarded.”168
Another attorney directly blamed sizeable lottery jackpots for ever-
increasing jury awards: 
And I don’t know if anyone has done a statistical study, but I think that 
the sheer [number of] zeros that come up in lotteries make it no longer 
[unusual] for a jury to talk about $5 million, $10 million, $100 million, 
maybe a billion dollars in some of their judgments.  And [they] do it 
without any relationship to what the damage was.169
Today, the prospect of unsympathetic jurors convinces many 
corporations to settle170 or prefer litigation abroad.171  For instance, one 
lawyer recounted a discussion with a business executive: “Look, the 
odds we’re going to win this case are a toss-up.  I mean we’re before a 
California jury.  It should be a $200,000 case, but it’s a California jury 
so it could be $2 million.  Or we can settle it for $300,000.” 172  The 
business executive decided to settle.173
Legal historian Lawrence Friedman found that nineteenth-century 
juries were accustomed to living with calamity, accepted it as part of 
damages, particularly in frivolous lawsuits”); Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 984 (1992) (criticizing juries for their punitive damages awards); Neil Vidmar, 
The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 849 
(1998) (“Juries have been said, variously, to be . . . excessively generous in awarding compensatory 
damages, and out of control when awarding punitive damages.”). 
 166. Lande, supra note 145, at 33 (alteration in original). 
 167. Moses, supra note 141, at 592–93; see also Daniels, supra note 141, at 273; Lande, supra 
note 145, at 34–35. 
 168. Daniels, supra note 141, at 280. 
 169. Lande, supra note 145, at 33–34 (alteration in original). 
 170. Karen Orren, Judicial Whipsaw: Interest Conflict, Corporate Business & the Seventh 
Amendment, 18 POLITY 70, 85 (1985). The pressures and concerns forcing settlement in the shareholder 
derivative context also appear in the class action context.  See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 
1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Judge Posner stated that certification of a class action, even one lacking in 
merit, forced defendants “to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by 
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability.”); see also HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973) (calling class action settlements 
induced by a small probability of an immense judgment “blackmail settlements”).
 171. Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China from a U.S. 
Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 780 (2004) (“Ironically, even U.S. 
manufacturers, who are supposedly more receptive to the U.S. judicial system, prefer to litigate abroad, 
partly because of their fear of generous jury awards of punitive damage at home.”). 
 172. Lande, supra note 145, at 21. 
173. Id.
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life, and awarded damages accordingly.174  Contrastingly, he found that 
twentieth-century juries desired total justice and expected fair treatment 
and full compensation for undeserved suffering.175  Such desires, as well 
as lawyers’ negative views of juries’ ability to rationally award 
damages, may help explain the development of technical rules of 
evidence governing damages issues.176  These evidentiary rules keep 
juries from hearing evidence or argument regarding “information about 
parties’ insurance coverage, treble damages in antitrust cases, attorneys’ 
fees, taxability of awards, settlement offers, and actual settlements 
involving some of the parties.”177  These rules are “designed to blindfold 
jurors, keeping from them information for fear that it might adversely 
affect their decisionmaking process.”178
B. The Criticisms of Juries Are Not Supported by Empirical Research 
Empirical research on juries undermines much of the criticism 
discussed in the prior subpart.  This research uses four primary 
methodologies: (1) mock jury experiments involving simulated trials, (2) 
post-deliberation interviews or surveys with ex-jurors, (3) analysis of 
jury verdicts in archival sources, and (4) field studies or experiments 
involving real juries. 179  The mock jury methodology has been used 
most frequently.180  While there are a few isolated studies on juries 
before World War II, systematic research on juries did not begin until 
1953 with the Chicago Jury Project conducted by researchers at the 
University of Chicago.181
1. Empirical Research Regarding Civil Juries Generally 
The empirical research examining juries’ performance reveals a 
different picture than the negative perceptions because it tends to show 
 174. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53 (1967). 
175. Id.; cf. Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 43 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (stating that the backlash against 
nineteenth century harsh tort doctrines “resulted in a renewed reliance on the [twentieth century] jury to 
humanize the law, a trend that has continued to the present day”). 
 176. JOINER, supra note 141, at 75. 
 177. William W. Schwarzer & Alan Hirsh, The Modern American Jury: Reflections on Veneration 
and Distrust, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 399, 402 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
178. Id. at 402. 
 179. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 626. 
180. Id.
181. Id. at 622. 
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that juries are competent decisionmakers.182  “[R]esearchers concur that 
jurors on the whole are conscientious, that they collectively understand 
and recall the evidence as well as judges, and that they decide factual 
issues on the basis of the evidence presented.”183  Moreover, “[s]erious 
students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their high regard for the 
jury as a decision-maker.”184  Additionally, surveys of judges—arguably 
the most significant and consistent jury observers—“show virtually 
unanimous support for the institution.”185
Though juries’ ability to rationally resolve disputes has been 
criticized, judges and juries frequently agree on the proper trial 
outcome.186  According to the Chicago Jury Project, judges and juries 
agreed on the appropriate verdict in 78% of the jury trials examined.187
This suggests that juries are not perplexed by complex cases and are 
generally able to reach rational results.188 A 1981 study published by the 
Federal Judicial Center provided further evidence that juries are able to 
adjudicate complex legal issues when it found that “[a]lmost without 
exception, respondents who acknowledged the existence of difficult 
issues in their jury trials also mentioned explicitly that the jury had made 
 182. Neil Vidmar, The American Jury System for Ausländer (Foreigners), 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 95, 122 (2003). 
 183. Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109 
(1996). 
184. Id.
 185. Moses, supra note 141, at 596; see also Hans, supra note 141, at 261–65; Judges’ Opinions 
on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time 
on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV 731, 746–47 (1989) (According to one survey, an 
overwhelming majority of judges believe that juries “usually make a serious effort to apply the law as 
they are instructed (99% federal, 98% state); [d]o not believe that the feelings jurors have about the 
parties often cause them to make inappropriate decisions (80% federal, 69% state). . . . Even in complex 
cases involving scientific or highly technical issues, there is a marked reluctance to abandon the jury 
system even though there is widespread recognition of the difficulties involved. . . . Majorities of judges 
reject the suggestion that there should be a limitation on the use of juries for complex civil cases 
involving highly technical and scientific issues (52% federal, 59% state), or for very complicated 
business cases (60% federal, 58% state).”). 
186. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 
GA. L. REV. 85, 101 (1991) (comparing the Chicago Jury Project finding that juries and judges agreed 
79% of the time with a Georgia study finding that 71 of the 91 Georgia judges (78%) estimated they 
agreed with the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and 
Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) (reporting that a one-year 
study of forty-five of the nations’ largest counties yielded “no substantial evidence that judges and juries 
differ in the rate at which they award punitive damages or in the central relation between the size of 
punitive awards and compensatory awards”). 
 187. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., 
The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (stating that the Chicago Project studied 
jury verdicts in personal injury cases and compared the jury’s decision to what the judge stated he or she 
would have found). 
 188. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1055. 
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the correct decision or that the jury had no difficulty applying the legal 
standard to the facts.”189 Moreover, contrary to the popular belief that 
judges are better able to weed out biased evidence because of their legal 
training, the evidence suggests that judges and jurors do not differ in 
their reactions to potentially biased information.190
In addition, a number of studies surveying a jury’s handling of 
technical or complex issues show that that judges do not fare better in 
the face of complexity than jurors.191  One study concluded that “[t]he 
jury does by and large understand the facts and get the case straight.”192
In 90% of disagreements between the jury and judge as to the proper 
trial outcome, the reason for disagreement was not the jury’s 
misunderstanding of the facts.193  In only 1 of the 3,576 cases studied by 
the Chicago Jury Project did the judge specifically state that he 
disagreed with the jury because of the jury’s inability to understand the 
case.194
Furthermore, when a case is factually complex, juries will ask more 
questions and take longer to decide the case.  According to the Chicago 
Jury Project, juries came back with questions in difficult cases about 
twice as often as in easy cases.195  Two researchers analyzed deliberation 
times from real juries and found that the more complex the case, the 
longer the juries deliberated.196  Juries that spend more time   
 189. GUINTHER, supra note 164, at 213 (emphasis in original). 
190. See Moses, supra note 141, at 595; see also Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil 
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125 (1994). 
 191. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, in 
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 192. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 149; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234 (“A close look at 
the number of cases, including several in which jury verdicts appear mistaken, does not show juries that 
are befuddled by complexity.  Even when juries do not fully understand technical issues, they can 
usually make enough sense of what is going on to deliberate rationally, and they usually reach 
defensible decisions.”). 
 193. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 152; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234–35 (“The 
empirical evidence also provides no reason to believe that judges will fare better in the face of 
complexity than juries . . . judges dealing with unfamiliar, technical information can be as confused as 
we fear similarly situated juries are. . . . [I]n complex cases we can expect that some judges will be more 
capable than the average jury, and we can expect that the average jury will be more capable than some 
judges.”). 
 194. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 153; Lempert, supra note 191, at 234 (“To the extent 
that juries make identifiable mistakes, their mistakes seem most often attributable not to conditions 
uniquely associated with complexity, but to the mistakes of judges and lawyers, to such systematic 
deficiencies of the trial process as battles of experts and the prevalence of hard-to-understand jury 
instructions, and to the kinds of human error that affect simple trials as well.”). 
 195. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 155 (reporting that juries returned with questions 14% 
of the time in easy cases and 27% of the time in difficult cases). 
 196. Thomas L. Brunell et al., Time to Deliberate: Factors Influencing the Duration of Jury 
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deliberating also appear less influenced by pretrial media coverage.197
The importance of the right to jury trial for litigants is bolstered by 
the relatively low percentage of jury waiver clauses in complex 
contracts.  A study covering jury waiver clauses in large, commercial, 
and complex contracts showed that only 20% of more than 2,800 
contracts examined had jury waiver clauses.198  Although other factors 
undoubtedly influence parties’ decisions to omit jury waiver clauses in 
complex contracts, the absence of such clauses may suggest that some 
parties do not want to eliminate the choice as to who decides their 
cases.199
Criticisms that juries favor plaintiffs in civil litigation have also been 
undermined by the empirical research.  The Chicago Jury Project found 
that in 12% of civil cases, the jury favors the plaintiff and in 10% of 
cases the judge favors the plaintiff.200  As odds would predict, studies 
also show that plaintiffs tend to win about 50% of the time in civil 
cases.201
2. Empirical Research Regarding Civil Juries’ Damage Awards 
Criticisms about juries awarding excessive damages in civil litigation 
have also been undermined by empirical research.  The research shows 
that juries attempt to use a systematic process to determine damage 
awards.202  It also demonstrates that compensatory awards are 
moderately related to the seriousness of plaintiffs’ injuries and punitive 
damage awards are strongly related to the compensatory damages 
awarded.203  The typical civil jury award is not extraordinary large, 
Deliberation (2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, June. 24, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=996426 (including appendix with various data tables in multiple areas); see also 
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 157 (reporting that the average deliberation time was 2.1 hours in 
clear and easy cases, it was 3.3 hours in close and easy cases, and it was 4.5 hours in difficult cases). 
 197. Emily G. Owens, Justice for Hire: Financial Incentives in Jury Deliberation (3d Annual 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120336.
 198. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an 
Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 539, 541 (2007). 
 199. Moses, supra note 141, at 595. 
 200. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 187, at 64. 
 201. Vidmar, supra note 165, at 851; George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation. 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 55 (1984) (predicting that plaintiff success rates in civil 
jury trials should generally fall around 50% and that plaintiffs are not overly favored in civil jury trials); 
see also Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702 (stating that almost every major study on the topic has 
found that plaintiff success rates vary according to certain factors, particularly case type). 
 202. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 706. 
 203. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and 
Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); FRANK A. SLOAN ET 
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especially considering attorneys’ fees and court costs, and the amount 
has not drastically changed over the years when adjusted for inflation.204
The public perception that juries are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs, 
regularly award excessive sums of money, and are biased against 
defendants with “deep pockets” has likely been “unduly influenced by a 
selection bias in the media that focuses attention on atypical high-stakes 
cases and their outcomes.”205  It is true, however, that juries tend to 
award larger damages against corporate defendants than individual 
defendants.206
Neither juries nor judges are perfect dispute resolution mechanisms 
because both involve the potential for human error.  The empirical 
evidence, however, suggests that corporate executives possess either an 
irrational fear of juries or at least a fear based on inflated criticisms of 
juries.  Civil juries should not be categorically excluded as 
decisionmakers on the basis of such criticisms.  Moreover, as the next 
Part discusses, civil juries fulfill important roles beyond simply 
resolving disputes and these roles support giving civil juries a significant 
role in shareholder derivative litigation. 
IV. THE HISTORICAL AND CONTINUING VALUE OF THE CIVIL JURY
Despite frequent criticism, the jury system is an integral part of the 
United States’ justice system.  “The jury is almost by definition an 
exciting and gallant experiment in the conduct of serious human affairs; 
it is not surprising that virtually since its inception it has been embroiled 
AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993); Sentell, supra note 186, at 104 (reporting a Georgia 
study that found 71 of the 91 Georgia judges (78%) estimated they agreed with the jury’s verdict for the 
plaintiff and that of the judges that did not agree with juries’ awards for plaintiffs, “[a] slight majority of 
those judges (14) manifested a definite preference for higher damage awards than their juries were 
returning”); see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 186, at 779 (“Juries and judges award punitive damages 
at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory 
awards. Jury punitive awards have a bit more spread than judge awards, but the effect is not robust and 
leads to few jury punitive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award.”).
 204. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 703; see also GUINTHER, supra note 164, at 175 (noting that 
the Rand study found that most jury awards did not vary in terms of constant dollars and that, in major-
injury cases, some studies have shown that juries more frequently err on the conservative side); Charles 
E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1952) 
(“[W]hen it comes to a calculation of damages under the flexible rules of tort law the estimate of what 
loss the plaintiff suffered can best be made by men who know different standards of working and living 
in our society.”). 
 205. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 702. 
206. Id. at 706; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 623, 640 (1997); Brian J. Ostrom, A Step above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in 
the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 238 (1996). 
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in controversy . . . .”207  Beginning with early legal journals, 
commentators have argued for the abolition of the jury or, at least, for 
keeping complex issues away from the jury.208  The jury, however, has 
proved an amazingly resilient institution.209  Critics of the civil jury too 
often focus on its dispute resolution task, while ignoring the other 
important roles fulfilled by the American jury as embodied in the 
Seventh Amendment.210
A. The Civil Jury Has a Long History in the United States 
The concept of the civil jury stretches back thousands of years.  Its 
roots trace back 2,500 years to ancient Greece, where juries decided the 
outcome of trials and determined penalties.211  Later, the Magna Charta 
declared that no man should be condemned without the lawful judgment 
of his peers.212  Americans have relied on the civil jury to resolve legal 
disputes since the beginning of the colonial period.213
English colonists brought the civil jury system to America.214  The 
1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties specifically provided for civil 
juries, and jury trials were available in virtually all civil, as well as 
criminal, cases in Virginia as early as 1642.215  Later, during the 
American Revolution, the jury’s value was “enhanced because juries 
regularly thwarted British objectives and provided a bulwark against 
royal tyranny.”216  After the United States gained its independence from 
Britain in 1776, every former colony embraced the right to trial by jury 
 207. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1055–56; see also Landsman, supra note 175, at 37 (noting that 
the drafters only mentioned the civil jury twice during the constitutional debates by the delegates and 
“[t]hese two brief discussions resulted in the decision to refrain from mentioning the civil jury in the 
Constitution’s text, because, the delegates said, ‘the Representatives of the people may be safely trusted 
in this matter.’” (quoting Mr. Gorham on September 12, 1787, originally reported in JAMES MADISON,
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
dfc/dfc_0912.htm)). 
 208. Oliver P. Shiras, The Jury System, 1 YALE L. J. 45, 47 (1891); Alfred C. Coxe, The Trials of 
Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286, 292 (1901) (“I believe it is a mistake to think that there would be any 
general regret were jury trials abolished in the class of civil cases to which I have alluded [civil matters 
with complex factual situations].”). 
 209. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 622. 
210. Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1419–20 (1997) 
[hereinafter The Civil Jury]. 
211. See id. at 1414–17. 
212. Id. at 1418. 
 213. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 
(1999). 
 214. SWARD, supra note 149, at 90. 
 215. Landsman, supra note 213, at 285.
216. Id. at 288; see also SWARD, supra note 149, at 90–91. 
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and it was probably the only right “universally secured by the first 
American state constitutions.”217  In fact, many of the early states 
granted a right to jury trial even in equitable actions.218
In drafting the U.S. Constitution, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
disagreed as to when a right to a jury trial existed.219  However, as 
Alexander Hamilton stated: 
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in 
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or 
if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the 
very palladium of free government.220
After much debate, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists compromised 
on the right to a jury trial.221  The right to a civil jury trial did not appear 
in the Constitution as originally approved by the states in 1788, but it 
was incorporated into the Seventh Amendment when the Bill of Rights 
was adopted in 1791.222  As previously explained, the Seventh 
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for all legal claims.223
The history of the civil jury demonstrates that early Americans 
believed juries of ordinary people, exempt from corruption, could 
resolve society’s disputes.224  Though the civil jury is arguably less 
valued than the criminal jury,225 the civil jury continues to play the 
important role originally envisioned by the Seventh Amendment.226
And, while the jury has undergone changes, especially in the nineteenth 
century,227 it remains a prized institution that plays an important role in 
 217. Landsman, supra note 213, at 288 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960)). 
 218. Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil 
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 836–38, 848 (1980). 
 219. SWARD, supra note 149, at 91–93. 
 220. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 221. Wolfram, supra note 75, at 672–73 (“While many of their [anti-Federalists] arguments 
concerning the form of the national government and the extent of its powers were ultimately rejected, 
the antifederalist arguments concerning civil jury trial (and other guarantees that were enacted into the 
Bill of Rights) ultimately prevailed. . . . [T]here is no surviving evidence that the shape of the seventh 
amendment enacted by a federalist Congress and approved by federalist state legislatures varied 
significantly from what the antifederalists had been arguing for during the ratification process.”). 
 222. Landsman, supra note 213, at 289. 
223. See supra Part II.B. 
 224. Arnold, supra note 218, at 835.
225. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1412 (noting the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury 
has not been applied to the states while the Sixth Amendment right to criminal jury has). 
 226. Landsman, supra note 213, at 304. 
227. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 
(1964).  Modifications of the civil jury mechanism over the past several decades include relaxing the 
unanimity rule and allowing smaller juries.  Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a state 
2009] SHAREHOLDERS IN THE JURY BOX 161 
American democracy.228  As the Supreme Court has noted: 
“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance 
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any 
seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with 
the utmost care.”229
B. The Civil Jury’s Role in American Democracy 
The civil jury is not only a dispute resolution mechanism; it is also a 
check against the power of judges and legislatures, a legitimator of legal 
decisions, and a forum for democracy.  Juries are also “equalizers, 
capable of bridging the power gap between a big company and an 
injured person and thereby reflecting our distinctively American respect 
for the individual.”230  The civil jury system, however, does cost jurors 
and the judicial system both time and money.  Yet, such costs have long 
been viewed as outweighed by the values of liberty, democracy, and 
political community associated with the civil jury.231
The civil jury is a check against judges.232  In the colonial period, 
Americans preferred the decentralized jury trial over a decision by a 
single judge, because the judge was viewed as the executive’s agent.233
For this reason, Americans politically opposed courts of equity and 
court conviction of a criminal defendant by less than a unanimous jury); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 
149 (1973) (upholding a civil court verdict of a six-person jury). 
228. See The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1436; STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND 
ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 215 (1994) (“We are still, through the jury, a government of and 
by the ordinary people.”); Landsman, supra note 175, at 54–55 (“History teaches that the jury has been 
protean, repeatedly adapting to the needs of changing times. . . . Our loss [of the civil jury] could not be 
measured in terms of the jury’s past service alone.  We would also be deprived of the adaptations yet to 
be fashioned in response to the ever changing needs of society.”). 
 229. Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959). 
 230. ADLER, supra note 228, at 215–16. 
231. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1413. 
 232. Orren, supra note 170, at 85; Wolfram, supra note 75, at 653 (stating that one of the purposes 
behind the Seventh Amendment is to protect a civil litigant “against an oppressive and corrupt federal 
judge”); see also JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/dfc/dfc_0912.htm (stating that in the 1787 constitutional debates, Mr. Gerry 
“urged the necessity of Juries to guard [against] corrupt judges”). 
233. See Arnold, supra note 218, at 830, 835; JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY 
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 22–23 (1994) (noting that in early America, the British forced 
Americans to be tried in England by British juries in an effort to quash American independence and 
democracy); Landsman, supra note 175, at 35 (“From the 1760s until the Revolution, the jury came, in 
the colonial mind, to represent the most effective means available to secure the independence and 
integrity of the judicial branch of government.  It was precisely for this reason that the British authorities 
increasingly sought either to control or to avoid jury adjudications.  The fight over jury rights was, in 
reality, the fight for American independence and served to help unite the colonies.”). 
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associated them with exercises of arbitrary power.234  Thus early 
Americans valued juries as a check on judges, who could otherwise 
exercise their power oppressively, arbitrarily, or corruptly.235  As 
Alexander Hamilton argued: 
[T]rial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. . . .  As 
matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury; 
for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally 
grant a new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practise 
upon the jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a 
double security; and it will readily be perceived that this complicated 
agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions.  By increasing the 
obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of 
either.  The temptations to prostitution which the judges might have to 
surmount, must certainly be much fewer, while the [cooperation] of a jury 
is necessary, than they might be, if they had themselves the exclusive 
determination of all causes.”236
The jury thus fulfills a significant countervailing function against the 
judge. 
The civil jury is also important as a legitimator of trials.  The jury 
helps guarantee the integrity of trials because it is more difficult to 
corrupt twelve jurors than one judge.237  It also generates public 
confidence in its verdicts because it is composed of laypersons and, 
therefore, instills a sense of inclusion and participation.238  Furthermore, 
that each jury is composed of different individuals helps diffuse 
dissatisfaction with verdicts.239  Juries also play a regulating role by 
 234. Arnold, supra note 218, at 830. 
 235. Wolfram, supra note 75, at 670–71; see also Arnold, supra note 218, at 834; The Civil Jury, 
supra note 210, at 1429 (noting that an important aspect of the jury system is its check on “oppressive 
officialdom” or “security against corruption”). 
 236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
 237. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1062; see also ADLER, supra note 228, at 6 (“It seems 
wonderfully in keeping with our democratic ideal that we allow juries of ordinary people to have this 
power [to give verdicts].  By doing so, we deny powerful judicial officials who may have political 
agendas from shaping . . . history for us. . . . It’s no accident that the Communist-era Soviet Union did 
without a jury system and, as it fought in 1993 to develop as a democracy, Russia was working to 
establish one.”). 
238. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1433; see also WILLIAM ORVILLE DOUGLAS, WE THE 
JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA
389 (1956) (“A jury reflects the attitudes and mores of the community from which it is drawn.  It lives 
only for the day and does justice according to its lights . . . it also takes the sharp edges off a law and 
uses conscience to ameliorate a hardship.  Since it is of and from the community, it gives the law an 
acceptance which verdicts of judges could not do.”). 
239. See Kalven, supra note 187, at 1062 (stating that the civil jury legitimates legal judgments by 
acting as “a lightning rod for animosity and suspicion which might otherwise center on the more 
exposed judge”); see also 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 19 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
(Anti-federalists believed that, “[j]uries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the 
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establishing a pattern of trial outcomes; the predictability of a trial 
outcome is an important factor in settlement negotiations.240  A jury’s 
decision not only affects the rights and duties of the parties at bar, but it 
also establishes a “pattern of trial outcomes that serves as a backdrop to 
private settlement negotiations. Juries thus exert a regulating influence 
in the legal system by disseminating information about the probabilities 
of trial outcomes.”241  Because the legal system remains connected to 
public sentiment through the jury system, the jury is also essential to the 
continued popular acceptance of judicial authority.242
The civil jury is also important to American democratic government.  
Service on a civil jury is a form of political participation by citizens.243
Before the Constitution was ratified, even the Anti-Federalists 
acknowledged the parallel between jury service and the right to vote.244
Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote the seminal Democracy in America, 
found that: 
people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury’s right to return a general verdict in all cases 
sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul of the judicial department.”). 
240. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1423; Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury 
Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 307 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (“[T]he 
most significant function of juries is to shape the parties’ predictions about what will happen if the case 
goes to trial.”). 
241. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1423 (footnote omitted); Schuck, supra note 240, at 307 
(Parties use these outcomes to create a “complex screening process that determines the mix of the cases 
that are initiated, the pattern of pre-trial settlements, and the mix of the cases that go to trial.”).  For 
empirical studies on jury decisions and case settlement patterns, see George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, 
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) and Theodore Eisenberg, Testing 
the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990). 
 242. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation of 
Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 59 (1977). 
243. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1437; PATRICK DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 127 (1979) (“In a 
democracy, law is made by the will of the people and obedience is given to it not primarily out of fear 
but from goodwill. . . . The jury is the means by which the people play a direct part in the application of 
the law.”); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. 
Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J. dissenting) (“In the process of gaining 
public acceptance for the imposition of sanctions, the role of the jury is highly significant.  The jury is a 
sort of ad hoc parliament convened from the citizenry at large to lend respectability and authority to the 
process. . . . Any erosion of citizen participation in the sanctioning system is in the long run likely, in my 
view, to result in a reduction in the moral authority that supports the process.”); United States v. Levine, 
83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (Judge Learned Hand commenting that a jury’s verdict is “really a small 
bit of legislation ad hoc”).
244. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1437; 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 38 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1981) (“The trial by jury is—the democratic bench of the judiciary power—more 
necessary than representatives in the legislature; for those usurpations, which silently undermine the 
spirit of liberty, under the sanction of law, are more dangerous than direct and open legislative attacks; 
in the one case the treason is never discovered until liberty, and with it the power of defence is lost; the 
other is an open summons to arms, and then if the people will not defend their rights, they do not 
deserve to enjoy them.”). 
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The system of the jury, as it is understood in America, appears to me to 
be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the 
people as universal suffrage.  These institutions are two instruments of 
equal power, which contribute to the supremacy of the majority.  All the 
sovereigns who have chosen to govern by their own authority, and to 
direct society instead of obeying its directions, have destroyed or 
enfeebled the institution of the jury.245
Further, he found juries useful for American democracy: “I think that 
the practical intelligence and political good sense of the Americans are 
mainly attributable to the long use which they have made of the jury in 
civil causes.”246  Political scientists find that the American participatory 
model of democracy depends upon high levels of civic activity.  Ideally, 
as part of their duties and rights, citizens participate in periodic elections 
and regularly take part in local community activities such as jury 
service.247  Political scientists have argued that citizen involvement in 
even minor aspects of public life promotes widespread public 
involvement.248  Some researchers have even found that participating on 
a jury may increase the likelihood of voting in the future.249
In addition, the civil jury is one of society’s most effective means of 
popular education250 and gives those who serve a sense of community 
responsibility.251  The jury has an impact on the jurors, because “it 
invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy, it makes them all feel the 
duties which they are bound to discharge towards society, and the part 
which they take in the Government.”252  As Judge Irving Kaufman 
 245. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (Henry Reeve trans., Colonial 
Press rev. ed. 1900) (1835). 
246. Id. at 290. 
 247. John Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection between Jury 
Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POLITICS 585, 585 (2002); ABRAMSON, supra note 233, 
at 2 (“Elections for president, governor, senator, or other office give power of a sort to the people by 
making those who are elected accountable to their constituents through the ballot box.  But this is a far 
cry from empowering the people themselves with the daily responsibility for governing. . . . By contrast, 
the jury version of democracy stands almost alone today in entrusting the people at large with the power 
of government . . . .”). 
 248. Gastil et al., supra note 247, at 586; 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 19 (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1981) (An Anti-federalist writer found that jury trials “are the means by which the people 
are let into the knowledge of public affairs—are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights, 
and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them.”). 
 249. Gastil et al., supra note 247, at 592 (“Registered voters who actively participated in criminal 
juries that successfully reached verdicts were more likely to vote in future elections than those 
empanelled jurors who simply played the role of alternate, had no chance to deliberate, or failed to reach 
a verdict after deliberating.”). 
250. See The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1408. 
 251. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386, 419 
(1954). 
 252. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 245, at 289. 
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observed, “there can be no universal respect for law unless all 
Americans feel that it is their law—that they have a stake in making it 
work.”253
The jury system also allows the community to identify with a 
governmental process and brings the community’s values into that 
process.254  The “civil jury is a democratic institution composed of 
laypersons [that] fosters a sense of inclusion and participation that 
reflects and generates popular endorsement of the judicial system.”255
The jury thus is intrinsically valuable as a means for society to actively 
participate in the administration of government and to keep the legal 
system in touch with public sentiment. 
Similar to its check against judges, the civil jury also serves as a 
check against legislatures’ unjust laws.256  Unlike modern juries, early 
juries decided both issues of fact and law, which allowed juries to have 
direct control over the substantive law of the community and to protect 
citizens against a tyrannical government.257  Juries in today’s 
courtrooms, however, do not enjoy this broad power.  Now, because 
juries primarily render judgments on the facts, their policymaking role 
has significantly decreased.258  But even today, the jury can frustrate the 
application of unjust laws by refusing to apply such laws.259  Although 
 253. Judge Irving Kaufman, A Fair Jury—The Essence of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 88, 91 (1967). 
 254. Alvin B. Rubin, Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Cases: Voice of Liberty or Verdict by 
Confusion? 462 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, Jul. 1982, at 87, 96; see also ADLER,
supra note 228, at 216 (stating that when a jury makes a decision, it reflects community values because 
“[t]he people who made that choice sprang from, and then would return to, the community that had to 
live with the decision—a satisfying prospect in a nation that takes democracy seriously.”); GUINTHER,
supra note 164, at 174–75 (stating that juries’ verdicts can represent community values; for example, 
“jurors—without making a separate punitive damage finding—sometimes add to an award against a 
defendant, their purpose to chastise or warn about improper conduct, not to promiscuously pick some 
insurance company’s pocket.”). 
255. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1433. 
 256. Orren, supra note 170, at 85; see also ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 
CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY 3 (1984) (“In channeling community values into the 
legal system, the jury also serves as a check on the possible excesses of the legislative branch.”); 
GUINTHER, supra note 164, at xiii (“Jury decisions, at times, have changed the course of history, have 
caused laws to be discarded or rewritten, have wrought guarantees of our freedoms.”); id. (“Thomas 
Jefferson and others have seen them [juries] as the public’s line of defense against the state when it acts 
oppressively, and Jefferson, for that reason, once declared that the right to trial by jury was more 
precious to the maintenance of a democracy than even the vote.”). 
 257. Arnold, supra note 218, at 835; Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: 
The Role of the Jury, 39 J. POLITICS 73, 78 (1977) (noting that, until the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the prevailing practice in jury trials was to allow the jury to consider the law and the facts in 
carrying out its duty). 
 258. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 78; see also The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1421 (stating 
that, once the jury’s power to resolve issues of law disappeared, its value as a forum for deliberative 
democracy diminished).
259. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1430; Wolfram, supra note 75, at 705 (“It has been 
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this power is restricted by the judge’s power to grant motions such as 
directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and new 
trials,260 the secrecy surrounding the jury’s deliberative process gives it 
the power to essentially dispense with the operation of law if it sees 
fits.261  The jury thus may mitigate otherwise harsh legal rules and create 
exceptions to laws.262  The jury also uses community judgment to affect 
policy where the law establishes criterion such as a reasonable standard 
of care or a reasonable person standard.263  In such cases, juries do not 
directly make policy, but implement policy in deciding how to apply the 
law to particular cases.264  Juries therefore bring community values into 
the judicial process265 and affect policy in terms of “what is actually 
being carried out, or enforced, in the real world.”266
V. EXTENDING A JURY TRIAL RIGHT TO SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
LITIGATION
The civil jury is by no means a perfect institution.  The civil jury has 
often been criticized by scholars, lawyers, and even judges.  Empirical 
research, however, undermines much of this criticism and reveals that 
the civil jury is not as inept as its critics suggest.  In addition, though the 
criticisms of the civil jury are directed at its dispute resolution 
function—the jury’s ability to competently handle its decisionmaking 
tasks, reach rational and unbiased decisions, award fair damages, and 
observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation.  This 
observation deserves to be canvassed.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 563 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. 
Cooke ed., 1961)). 
260. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1430; see FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (stating a judge may 
grant judgment as a matter of law once “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and 
the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 
party on that issue”);  FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)(2) & (3) (stating that if the judge denies the motion, the 
judge may grant a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the jury trial or order a new 
trial);  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (stating a judge may grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new 
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court”). 
 261. Broeder, supra note 251, at 411. 
262. Id.; Bernard D. Meltzer, A Projected Study of the Jury as a Working Institution, 287 ANNALS 
AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, May 1953, at 97, 98 (stating that the jury is able to mitigate a 
general law it views as too harsh); see also Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76.
 263. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 80; see also Broeder, supra note 251, at 389; Meltzer, supra 
note 262, at 98.
 264. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76. 
 265. Higginbotham, supra note 242, at 59–60; see also Arnold, supra note 218, at 833–34 (noting 
that juries were historically regarded as instruments of local government); ADLER, supra note 228, at 
216 (Juries “apply community values to complex matters of commerce, a democratization of business 
rules attempted in few other nations.”). 
 266. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 76 (citing WILLIAM A. WELSH, STUDYING POLITICS 105 
(1973)). 
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understand complex cases—the civil jury is not merely a dispute 
resolution instrument.  The civil jury also serves other vital purposes, 
including purposes that could significantly benefit shareholder 
derivative litigation. 
A. Expanding a Right to Jury Trial for all Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation 
If a normative decision allows jury trials for legal claims in 
shareholder derivative litigation in all courts, the next question is how to 
implement such a change.  The easiest and quickest way would be for 
the Supreme Court to hold that the Seventh Amendment applies to the 
states.267  Then all states would have to follow Ross v. Bernhard and a 
right to a jury trial would exist for legal claims asserted in shareholder 
derivative actions.  Otherwise, implementing such a change would be 
more complicated.  For those states that currently do not permit any 
right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation, the state 
legislatures could enact statutes extending a right to jury trial to legal 
claims asserted in shareholder derivative litigation.  Alternatively, the 
highest court in those states could adopt the reasoning of Ross v. 
Bernhard through common law development or possibly an 
interpretation of the state constitution.  As discussed in the following 
subparts, the advantages of expanding the right to jury trial for legal 
claims in shareholder derivative actions outweigh the disadvantages. 
1. Equality Among Cases 
Shareholder derivative lawsuits are no more complicated than other 
lawsuits, and therefore courts cannot rationally treat them differently.  
Though judges and scholars argue that shareholder derivative actions are 
too complex for juries, denying any right to a jury trial in shareholder 
derivative actions is inconsistent with the use of juries in other complex 
cases.  For instance, complicated medical and legal malpractice cases are 
entrusted to juries.  Similarly, juries resolve complex and highly 
technical issues in intellectual property and antitrust cases, as well as in 
cases involving engineering, architectural, and construction disputes.  
Like shareholder derivative litigation, these cases often involve multiple 
parties, vague standards of liability, and complex transactions. 
Although these cases present complex issues in areas in which jurors 
typically have no specialized knowledge, courts allow the jury to 
 267. Future work by the author will explore this issue, but to do so in the Article is unnecessary. 
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evaluate the evidence and weigh the testimony to determine if a certain 
legal standard of conduct was violated.  The modern trend demonstrates 
that courts increasingly trust jurors, aided by expert testimony when 
necessary, to make rational decisions in these complex cases.  For 
example, physicians traditionally were not liable for malpractice unless 
their conduct was not considered customary in the medical field.268  If an 
expert gave undisputed testimony that a physician’s actions 
corresponded with customary practice, the physician was not liable for 
malpractice.269  Today, however, courts permit juries to consider expert 
testimony and determine the reasonable standard of care under the 
circumstances.270  Thus, this modern trend supports expanding the right 
to a jury trial in shareholder derivative actions. 
Most importantly, juries are entrusted with resolving actions that are 
virtually identical to shareholder derivative litigation.  When a 
corporation, rather than its shareholders, litigates a matter, the 
corporation is entitled to a jury trial on any legal claims;271 thus the jury 
is trusted with the power to hear such claims.  The action is derivative 
only because the board of directors is disabled in some way from 
bringing the claim; if the board is not disabled, the shareholder cannot 
pursue a derivative action.  It is irrational to deny shareholder derivative 
actions equal footing with the same actions pursued directly by 
corporations. 
Similarly, the Department of Justice, when it criminally prosecutes 
corporate wrongdoers, and the SEC, when it brings enforcement 
proceedings, have a right to jury trial.  Shareholders who file 
shareholder derivative litigation based on the same conduct, however, 
may not.272  It is nonsensical to argue that a jury can understand the 
corporate conduct involved in criminal and enforcement cases, but 
cannot comprehend that same conduct in the context of a derivative 
action.  These cases are no more complicated than shareholder 
derivative actions and therefore deserve equal treatment in the right to 
jury trial. 
Finally, to the extent that the laws commonly implicated in 
shareholder derivative actions are too complicated, then the civil jury 
also acts as a check on the legal system.  As a potential juror, the 
 268. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909,
913 (2002). 
269. Id. at 911–12. 
270. Id. at 911–14. 
271. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533–34 (1970). 
 272. An example is the federal criminal prosecution of Enron’s former CEOs, Kenneth Lay and 
Jeffrey Skilling, which was followed by shareholder derivative litigation.  See Russell Powell, The 
Enron Trial Drama: A New Case for Stakeholder Theory, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2007). 
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average citizen must comprehend the law to apply the law (as well as to 
obey the law).273  The civil jury thus serves as a constraint on an 
increasingly complex legal system274 by influencing legislators to create 
laws that are understandable and acceptable to average citizens who 
serve as jurors.275  Juries also influence attorneys by requiring them to 
understand a case well enough to organize and comprehensibly 
communicate it to jurors lacking legal experience.276
2. Minimize Distorting Influences 
Extending the right to jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation 
also minimizes the incentive for forum shopping presented by the 
current legal landscape.  For derivative actions filed in federal court, the 
Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard held “that the right to jury trial 
attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, 
if it had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a 
jury.”277  Thus, for shareholder derivative actions filed in federal court 
or in state courts that follow Ross v. Bernhard, the shareholders are 
entitled to a jury trial on any legal claims asserted.  Because most states 
have declined to extend any jury trial right to shareholder derivative 
actions—based on negative views of civil juries and the historically 
equitable nature of such actions—differing jury trial rights can produce a 
strong incentive for plaintiffs to forum shop when filing a shareholder 
derivative action. 
Admittedly, the right to a jury trial is not the only basis on which 
plaintiffs forum shop when filing shareholder derivative lawsuits.  Most 
courts have special pleading standards for shareholder derivative 
actions, which require the plaintiffs to plead either that they made a 
demand on the board of directors or the reasons such a demand is 
excused.  This pleading standard is rarely a basis for forum shopping, 
however, because it is very common.278  Some forums try to prevent 
strike suits and other frivolous lawsuits by restricting which 
shareholders may bring derivative actions, such as requiring that the 
plaintiff-shareholders represent a specified percentage or dollar 
273. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1439. 
 274. Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 703 (1986); see also The Civil Jury, 
supra note 210, at 1437. 
 275. Jacobsohn, supra note 257, at 81. 
276. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1439. 
 277. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970). 
278. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1. 
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investment in the corporation.279  Such filing restrictions may lead 
shareholder-plaintiffs to choose an alternative forum. 
“There is nothing inherently evil about forum-shopping”280 and all 
lawsuits likely involve some degree of forum shopping.281  Forum 
shopping is not one act or course of conduct, but rather encompasses 
various factors and choices.282  Forum shopping “is only a pejorative 
way of saying that, if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he 
will naturally choose the one which he thinks his case can be most 
favourably presented: this should be a matter neither for surprise nor for 
indignation.”283  Nevertheless, different rules governing the right to a 
jury trial in shareholder derivative litigation present some negative 
consequences. 
Procedure is a powerful litigation tool, and procedural differences can 
impact forum selection.  As Representative John Dingell stated: “I’ll let 
you write the substance . . . and you let me write the procedure, and I’ll 
screw you every time.”284  Procedural differences can lead to differences 
in the ultimate outcome of the case.285  These incentives distort       
279. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2009) (allowing a court to compel a shareholder 
who owns less than a prescribed amount of stock to post a bond); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 
(McKinney 2003) (same); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1835 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states adopting bond requirements).  Delaware also requires: 
an affidavit stating that the [plaintiff] has not received, been promised or offered and will 
not accept any form of compensation, directly or indirectly, for prosecuting or serving as   
a representative party in the derivative action in which the person or entity is a named    
part except (i) such fees, costs or other payments as the Court expressly approves to be 
paid to or on behalf of such person, or (ii) reimbursement, paid by such person’s   
attorneys, of actual and reasonable out-of-pocket expenditures incurred directly in 
connection with the prosecution of the action. 
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(b). 
 280. Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987). 
281. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 143, at 121; Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, 
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 555 (1989); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 n.1 (1995) (calling 
forum shopping a “national legal pastime”). 
 282. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 345–46 (2006). There are “five 
basic, and overlapping, types of decisionmaking considerations inherent in forum selection: (1) choices 
involving federal courts versus state courts; (2) choices involving courts in different states; (3) choices 
involving different substantive laws; (4) choices involving different procedural provisions; and (5) 
choices involving subjective and personal factors.”  Id. 
 283. Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553,
571 (1989). 
284. Regulatory Reform Act, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental 
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce). 
 285. Kimberly A. Morre & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1325, 1331 (2002). 
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shareholder derivative litigation, and may lead to such actions being 
filed in states which are unfamiliar with the substantive law applied to 
the merits of the challenged directors’ decisions. At a minimum, 
inequality in the treatment of shareholders results when similar 
derivative actions possess differing rights to jury trial based solely on 
the courts in which such actions are filed. 
Different rules for the right to a jury trial also incentivize plaintiff-
shareholders to creatively plead their cases.  For instance, when a 
plaintiff cannot file a shareholder derivative action in a court that would 
permit a jury trial, that plaintiff has an incentive to creatively plead that 
their claims are not derivative but rather direct, which will provide the 
right to jury trial of any legal issues.  In a shareholder derivative lawsuit, 
the injury was to the corporation and thus the cause of action and any 
recovery belongs to the corporation.  By contrast, in a direct shareholder 
lawsuit, the injury is to the shareholder and the recovery belongs to the 
shareholder.  For example, if the corporation breaches a contractual right 
of one class of shareholders, those shareholders have a direct cause of 
action.  By creatively pleading their case as a direct shareholder action, a 
right to a jury trial exists for those claims even though the state would 
deny a right to a jury trial if it were a derivative suit.  Nevertheless, there 
is no difference between direct and derivative action trials. 
3. Avoid Excessive Deference to Directors and Officers 
Entrusting enforcement to civil juries in shareholder derivative 
actions is also wise based on judges’ past performance.  Accepting the 
argument advanced by judges and scholars that civil juries are incapable 
of resolving complex business cases is troubling.  Judges have 
historically shown great deference to the decisions of corporate 
executives on the rationale that “judges are not business experts.”286
Scholars also believe that “courts are ill-equipped to review business 
decisions” because they “often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or 
surmises as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost 
structure, and economic and industry trends” and are “not susceptible to 
systematic analysis.”287  Yet, the judiciary has not created a “medical 
judgment rule” or a “design judgment rule” that precludes judicial 
286. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Douglas M. 
Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002) 
(stating “courts are ill-equipped to review business decisions” because they “often involve intangibles, 
intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and 
economic and industry trends” and are “not susceptible to systematic analysis”).
 287. Branson, supra note 286, at 637. 
172 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
review in medical malpractice or product liability cases.288  No other 
profession or issue is deemed too complicated for judges to review.289
As noted in Part II, the business judgment rule defense operates as a 
presumption that directors have acted consistent with their fiduciary 
duties in making corporate decisions.290  This presumption alone 
demonstrates judicial deference to defendants in derivative litigation.  
Further, because defendants can assert the business judgment rule 
defense in motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and 
motions for directed verdicts at trial, defendants have continuous 
opportunities to argue essentially the same defense to the judge.291
Consequently, the judge possesses a great deal of power to end 
shareholder derivative litigation in favor of defendants and may be more 
likely to do so after repeated argument.  Judges’ deference to directors is 
well documented by the vast number of cases in which judges have 
protected directors from legal liability based on the business judgment 
rule defense.292  For instance, the Delaware Chancery Court, which sits 
without juries, rarely imposes liability on corporate executives for 
breaching their fiduciary duties.  That perhaps explains why many 
Fortune 500 companies choose to incorporate in Delaware.293  Because 
judges give inordinate deference to directors’ decisions compared to the 
deference accorded other defendants, civil juries can act as a 
counterbalance to judges at least in those shareholder derivative actions 
that reach trial.294  Empowering the jury to decide whether directors 
288. See Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 120 (noting that “no ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design 
judgment’ rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or product liability cases”). 
289. See id.; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (asking why “the same judges who decide whether 
engineers have designed the compressors on jet engines properly . . . cannot decide whether a manager 
negligently failed to sack a subordinate who made improvident loans”); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. 
Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule:  Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L.
REV. 587, 613–17 (1994) (discussing the differences between courts’ review of business and medical 
decisions); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 581 
(opining that “judges should find it far easier to overcome the barrier of expertise and stand in the shoes 
of outside directors than in those of almost any of the other professionals whose actions courts are 
routinely called upon to review”). 
290. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000). 
291. See supra Part II. 
292. See Fairfax, supra note 17, at 409 (“[T]he tremendous deference courts grant to board 
decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious examples of director 
misconduct.”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical strong protection of corporate boards”). 
293. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON BUSINESS LAWS AND 
THE ECONOMY, JANUARY 1995, at 8 (“The Delaware Chancery Court is one reason many Fortune 500 
companies choose to incorporate in that state.”). 
294. See supra Part III.B. 
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have breached their fiduciary duties is a better mechanism for providing 
just resolution of shareholder derivative actions. 
4. Superior Group Decisionmaking 
Twelve jurors participating in open-minded discussions will reach 
better results than one judge acting alone.295  “The distinctive strength 
and safeguard of the jury system is that the jury operates as a group” and 
“twelve lay heads are very probably better than one.”296
Judges cannot test their unconscious mental and emotional prejudices 
against the reactions of others, as can members of a jury while 
deliberating.297  As such, a jury may prove more impartial than the judge 
in relation to a particular case being tried.  The American justice system 
relies on an adversarial form of justice, in which adversaries present 
proof in a highly structured setting and then the decisionmaker renders a 
decision.298  “The jury is the most neutral and passive decisionmaker 
available . . .” because, unlike a judge, it does not rule on any pretrial 
motions and is not involved in the lawsuit’s administration.299  Also 
unlike a judge, the jury does not hear pretrial disputes and only 
considers evidence deemed not greatly prejudicial according to the rules 
of evidence.300  The jury will also not have certain prejudices that judges 
may develop towards certain types of claims, parties, or lawyers.301
Moreover, a group with a variety of perspectives represents the 
community in the legal decisionmaking process and lessens the 
possibility that one individual’s idiosyncratic views will control the 
outcome.  The individuals comprising a jury possess diverse views and 
their role on the jury brings them together to deliberate until they reach a 
desirable communal solution to both moral and social issues.302
Although individual jurors likely have prejudices, the combination of 
individual jurors is intended to represent the community.303  In a 
democracy, this is the ideal means of addressing dissension and conflict: 
[L]ong ago, Aristotle suggested that democracy’s chief virtue was the 
way it permitted ordinary persons drawn from different walks of life to 
achieve a “collective wisdom” that none could achieve alone.  At its best, 
295. See Broeder, supra note 251, at 388. 
 296. Kalven, supra note 187, at 1067. 
 297. Meltzer, supra note 262, at 98.
 298. Landsman, supra note 213, at 288. 
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1441. 
 303. Orren, supra note 170, at 97.
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the jury is the last, best refuge of this connection among democracy, 
deliberation, and the achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons.304
Therefore, the jury is the best judicial and political institution to try 
cases and resolve society’s issues.305
Civil juries’ ability to bring community values to the judicial process 
and keep the judicial system in touch with public sentiment is vital today 
when shareholders have ample reason to distrust corporate executives, 
judges, and the government generally.  Through their verdicts, civil 
juries can instill meaning into the laws governing directors’ fiduciary 
duties. 
5. Undesirability of Specialized Knowledge 
Judges are not inherently more qualified than jurors to make factual 
conclusions on complicated issues.  Judges have legal backgrounds, but 
this does not give them specialized knowledge of complex areas such as 
the inner workings of a corporation, medicine, or computer 
technology.306  A judge likely has no more training in such areas than 
the average juror.307  In fact, in a group of twelve jurors it is likely that 
one or more jurors will possess worldly experiences touching on a 
question similar to the one in dispute.308
Likely the biggest objection to expanding the right to jury trial to 
shareholder derivative actions is the development of business courts 
during the past decade.309  As of 2008, some form of business court 
existed in twelve states as well as in several cities.310  “The phrase 
‘business courts’ is used as a generic term for the variety of courts and 
programs that have been created which are not separate courts at all, but 
divisions or programs within an existing court.”311  Some commentators 
consider the Delaware Court of Chancery the “most well known of the 
304. The Civil Jury, supra note 210, at 1441 n.145. 
305. See id. at 1441; Meltzer, supra note 262, at 98.
306. See Fabrikant v. Bache & Co. (In re U.S. Fin. Securities Litig.), 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 
1979).
307. Id.
 308. Broeder, supra note 251, at 388.  But see Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 
TEMP. L. REV. 493, 497 (2002) (arguing juror with specialized background knowledge that overlaps with 
the case’s central issue should be subject to a strike for cause to avoid potential bias).
 309. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of Business 
Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 151 n.1 (2004). 
 310. Lee Applebaum, The “New” Business Courts: Responding to Modern Business and 
Commercial Disputes, 17 BUS. LAW TODAY, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 13, 14 (also noting that Colorado, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Oklahoma are considering business courts). 
 311. Bach & Applebaum, supra note 309, at 151 n.1. 
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courts that are considered business courts.”312  The Delaware Chancery 
Court, however, is actually a traditional court of equity separate from the 
Delaware common law courts.313
Some states have created business courts to attract businesses,314 but 
the more typical justification is efficiency.315  Business courts often have 
expedited schedules that enable businesses to quickly resolve 
differences,316 and their dockets are generally separate from general 
litigation and criminal dockets that can slow resolution of business 
cases.317  The Delaware Chancery Court in particular has been praised 
for its ability to provide quick and effective action and for its refined 
body of law that provides businesses predictability.318  Contrarily, some 
supporters argue that business courts may benefit the justice system by 
improving case flow for other litigation areas319 because “business cases 
are known to move at a glacial pace, making it difficult for the 
businesses involved, and tying up the court system for other  
litigants.”320  Supporters also believe that “general courts are ill-
312. See id. at 216; Applebaum, supra note 310, at 13 (calling the Delaware Court of Chancery 
the “bright star” within specialized business courts). 
 313. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 341, 342 (2009). 
 314. Kimberly A. Ward, Getting Down to Business—Pennsylvania Must Create a Business Court, 
or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 415, 421 (1999) (finding that Pennsylvania’s business 
community and state government view business courts as an economic tool); Chad Kile, Oklahoma 
Lawmaker Proposes Specialized Businesses Court, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 4, 2003 (“If Oklahoma 
could get on the leading edge of this business court, we would look progressive—pro business.”); Jill 
Krueger, Roche Takes Reins of First Business Court, ORLANDO BUS. J., Oct. 31, 2003 (stating that the 
business court “represents an . . . opportunity for Orlando, and Florida for that matter, to demonstrate its 
commitment to achieving an efficient and meaningful resolution of business disputes.”). 
 315. Sheri Qualters, Verdict: Business Court Has Made Strong Case for Itself, BOSTON BUSINESS 
J., Aug. 2, 2002 (“Arguing before judges well-versed in business matters also speeds the process.”). 
316. Id.
317. See Sally Apgar, Proponents Say Separate Business Court Needed, STAR TRIB., Nov. 7, 
1990, at 1D. (“Both state and federal courts are so inundated with criminal cases that carry the right to a 
speedy trial, that business litigation gets put on a back burner.”); Dan Crawford, Ohio Bar Considers 
Push for Separate Business Court, BUS. FIRST OF COLUMBUS, Jan. 3, 1997 (stating that business cases 
“are being held hostage to the criminal docket”); see also Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts: 
Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) (arguing that the 
speed of business courts purportedly will aid “small and mid-size businesses which do not have 
resources to hire private . . . arbitrators” and “suffer most from the high costs and long delays of civil 
litigation”); National Center for State Courts, Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California 
Pilot Program, 3 CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 2 (reporting an empirical study based on the California 
pilot program for complex civil litigation showed that caseloads “were sufficiently reduced to give 
judges the relative luxury to engage in substantial supervision” and the cases moved faster through 
litigation than non-pilot program cases). 
 318. William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-
Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992). 
 319. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 17. 
 320. Junge, supra note 317, at 316–17 (also arguing that business courts would allow business 
cases to be resolved more quickly, free up resources for other cases, and decrease costs overall); see also 
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equipped to efficiently resolve sophisticated commercial disputes”321
and theorize that “a judge who is consistently hearing a limited—though 
not small—universe of case types will develop a greater knowledge and 
expertise in both the subject matter of these cases and in their procedural 
management.”322  In addition, business courts were partly created 
because business litigants and litigators wanted to avoid state trial courts 
in which multiple judges sometimes handled different aspects of the 
same case, leading to an allegedly “unpredictable, uninformed, and 
unreliable process.”323
These justifications for business courts, however, are not entirely 
incompatible with jury trials.  A judge in a business court could oversee 
the entire pretrial process in a given case, but a civil jury could still 
serve as the factfinder at trial.  More importantly, business courts create 
other systemic problems.  Judicial specialization creates “risks of 
myopia, lack of cross-pollinating ideas from learning other fields of the 
law, having the same judge hearing all cases in the same subjects for too 
long, and so on.”324  In addition, such business courts “may function 
with a bias toward commercial parties as opposed to individual 
nonbusiness litigants involved in commercial litigation.”325  Even the 
state’s involvement in creating business courts may create bias, because 
“[a] court whose very function is to facilitate the state’s commercial 
enterprise could easily develop a bias in favor of commercial parties or a 
bias against non-business litigants involved in commercial litigation.”326
Similarly, states’ creation of business courts to benefit or attract 
businesses may harm consumers and individual litigants.327
Notably, the vast majority of states have not rushed to create business 
courts.  “After years of study and analysis, California decided against 
Applebaum, supra note 310, at 17 (arguing that business courts “may become laboratories for 
innovations that can be used systemwide”). 
 321. Junge, supra note 317, at 315. 
 322. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 16 (“This will permit these specialist judges to make more 
reliable and informed decisions, and to do so with greater efficiency.”); Bach & Applebaum, supra note 
309, at 228 (“Judges presented daily with a field of law in which to cultivate their understanding, 
knowledge, and ability are more likely to come to deeper understandings about the inner workings of the 
legal principles they face; the patterns that may reveal themselves in the conduct of business cases; and 
the patterns of thinking and behavior that may appear in parties and counsel.”). 
 323. Applebaum, supra note 310, at 14. 
324. Id. at 16. 
 325. Junge, supra note 317, at 318. 
 326. Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class Actions and 
Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899, 913 (2008) 
(“The justice rendered by business courts has the potential to become questionable when these business 
courts decide claims brought against businesses by individuals, as they are increasingly doing in some 
states.”). 
327. Id.
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the creation of business courts.”328  The chair of California’s task force 
that studied such courts, Justice Richard Aldrich, stated that “the only 
place we found support [for business courts] was within the business 
community.”329  Perhaps one reason states are leery of business courts is 
their detrimental effect on the judicial system as a whole.330  “A 
specialized business court runs contrary to the goal of court unification 
and simplification.”331  Critics further worry about “a proliferation of 
courts where every interest has a court”332 and triggering more litigation 
with the streamlined process offered by business courts.333  Opponents 
also question how proposed business courts would be funded334 and the 
potentially limited number of cases that such courts would handle.335
Additionally, business courts could lead to “turf battles between regular 
trial division courts—many of whose judges feel capable of dealing with 
complex business disputes—and the specially created business 
courts.”336  Finally, business courts are unnecessary because judges 
“already ha[ve] the inherent power to use special case management 
techniques to address the goals of the business court.”337
B. Improving and Checking Civil Juries’ Performance 
Expanding the right to a jury trial in shareholder derivative actions is 
unlikely to flood the judicial system with substantially more jury trials.  
Although statistics are not available for derivative and direct shareholder 
actions ending in jury verdicts, only about 1% of cases in the state court 
systems and 2% in the federal system end with a verdict by a civil 
328. Id.
329. Id. at 914; see also Qualters, supra note 315 (reporting that a survey of the Suffolk Superior 
Court found 52% of attorneys were “extremely satisfied” with the court’s overall performance, 70% 
were extremely satisfied with the promptness of the court’s decisions, and 58% were extremely satisfied 
with the firmness of the schedule). 
330. See Junge, supra note 317, at 318. 
331. Id.
 332. Crawford, supra note 317. 
333. Id.
334. Id.; Sheri Qualters, Business Court to Expand to Other Counties, BOSTON BUSINESS J., Feb. 
14, 2003 (noting that “business-session litigants have had to hire their own court reporters at various 
times during the past couple of years” at the business-session of Suffolk Superior Court based in 
Boston). 
335. See Todd Bishop, Business Court Looking for a Bit More Business, PHILADELPHIA BUS. J.,
May 19, 2000; Press Millen, Why Do We Have a Business Court? at VI-B-7, 
http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/bl051208.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (noting that the North 
Carolina business court has more technology available to it than other courts and its judges receive law 
clerks unlike other judges). 
 336. Millen, supra note 335, at VI-B-6. 
 337. Junge, supra note 317, at 318. 
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jury.338  Moreover, of the more than 150,000 jury trials that take place 
each year in the United States, most involve torts such as automobile 
accidents and premises liability.339
Improving and monitoring the performance of civil juries may 
alleviate any lingering concerns about expanding the right to jury trial in 
shareholder derivative actions.  The opportunity to determine the 
“correct” verdict in actual jury trials is rare,340 so it is instead more 
useful to focus on procedural criteria that theoretically relate to the 
accuracy of jury verdicts including: (1) jurors’ thorough review of the 
facts in evidence, (2) jurors’ accurate comprehension of the judge’s 
instructions, (3) all jurors’ active participation, (4) resolution of 
differences through discussion by jurors rather than pressuring tactics, 
and (5) systematic matching of case facts to the requirements for the 
various verdict options.341
Published empirical research on jury decisionmaking identifies very 
similar factors as positively and consistently influencing juries’ 
decisions.  The research includes factors such as: definitions of key legal 
terms, verdict options, trial structure, jury–defendant demographic 
similarity, jury attitude composition, evidence strength, pretrial 
publicity, inadmissible evidence, case type, and the initial distribution of 
juror verdict preferences during deliberations.342
For example, in an extensive study of jurors in post-deliberation 
interviews from 225 trials, researchers found that the verdict preferred 
by the majority of jurors on the first ballot was the jury’s final verdict 
more than 90% of the time.343  The empirical data on non-unanimous 
juries suggest that they do not function as well as their unanimous 
counterparts and that non-unanimous rule juries virtually always cease 
serious deliberations once they have reached the majority required for a 
decision.344  Further, the smaller the required majority, the faster the 
338. See Landsman, supra note 213, at 289; see also Bureau of Justice Statistics, General Civil 
(Tort, Contract, and Real Property) Trials, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=2231 (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2010) (stating that of the 98,786 tort cases that were terminated in U.S. district courts 
during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, 1,647 or 2% were decided by a bench or jury trial).
 339. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 622; see also Ostrom, supra note 206, at 233–41 (stating that 
about 75% of the cases that go to civil juries are tort cases, and about two thirds of those involve 
automobile accidents or premises liability). 
 340. Devine et al., supra note 140, at 707. 
341. Id.
342. Id. at 622. 
343. Id. at 623; see Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes: Predeliberation 
Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 175–95 (1995) (indicating 
that one in ten trials results in a reversal of the verdict preference initially favored by the majority). 
344. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983). 
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jury’s deliberations.345  For example, juries that needed only to reach an 
eight-to-four verdict in a particular mock case deliberated 75 minutes on 
average, the ten-to-two juries took 103 minutes, and their unanimous 
jury counterparts needed 138 minutes.  Majority rule juries felt 
significantly less certain about the correctness of their decisions and the 
winning majority tended to “adopt a more forceful, bullying, persuasive 
style” of deliberating.346  The judicial system thus should require that 
civil juries in shareholder derivative actions reach unanimous verdicts.  
Further, research indicates that increased juror pay increases deliberation 
time,347 so jurors should receive higher pay to facilitate longer 
deliberation time and potentially improve trial outcomes. 
Importantly, juries are not completely unrestrained in rendering 
verdicts.  Trial and appellate courts operate as a “final check” upon 
juries’ deliberations and verdicts.  Trial courts are generally required to 
respect jury decisions, as juries are afforded broad latitude in assessing 
witness credibility and weight of the evidence.348  In limited 
circumstances, however, if juries reach the “wrong” decision, a trial 
judge may order a new trial.  For example, a trial judge may order a new 
trial if the judge believes errors occurred during the trial, such as 
erroneous jury instructions or erroneous admission of evidence.349  A 
trial judge also may order a new trial if the jury’s verdict is against the 
clear weight of the evidence (sometimes phrased as a manifestly unjust 
verdict), but not simply because the judge disagrees with the verdict.350
The reviewing judge also has several other options in response to a 
perceived incorrect verdict.  A judge may grant judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (now called judgment as a matter of law in 
federal courts), which grants judgment to the losing party upon a 
showing that it is the only rational result.351  Alternatively, the judge 
may require the plaintiff to choose between accepting a remittitur, which 
is a lower amount of damages than awarded by the jury, and a new 
345. Id. at 60, 95. 
346. Id. at 112. 
 347. Owens, supra note 197 (proposing jurors receive about fifty dollars per day based on a 2001 
study of the 1990 Offender Based Transaction Statistics). 
 348. Landsman, supra note 213, at 304. 
349. See, e.g., Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 87–88 (3d Cir. 1960).
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., Pa. R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 395 (1933); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (“If a 
party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would 
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) 
resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the 
party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a 
favorable finding on that issue.”). 
180 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
trial.352  In some states, a judge may even require the defendant to 
choose between additur, a judge-ordered increase in the amount of 
damages awarded, and a new trial.353  Similarly, the appellate courts 
possess limited authority to review jury verdicts. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporate conduct exposed in the recent financial collapse 
demonstrated the failure of prior legislative and regulatory responses 
intended to prevent future corporate governance crises.  Legislation 
alone will not end the greed of corporate directors and officers, nor will 
it force corporate executives to properly oversee corporate activity.  
Enforcement is crucial.  The SEC sometimes prosecutes enforcement 
proceedings under the federal securities laws and the Department of 
Justice occasionally initiates criminal charges under those laws.  But 
breaches of fiduciary duties are left for shareholders to pursue through 
derivative actions.  Unfortunately, most states assign the adjudication of 
such actions to judges, who have historically accorded great deference to 
corporate directors and officers.  For instance, the Delaware Chancery 
Court, which sits without juries, rarely imposes liability on corporate 
executives for breaching their fiduciary duties.  Thus, judges may not be 
the best enforcers of the legal obligations imposed on corporate directors 
and officers. 
To prevent the next crisis in corporate governance, the answer is not 
to enact more laws, but rather to change the enforcer of the existing 
laws.  Such an enforcer already exists—the civil jury.  Civil juries are 
widely utilized in complex cases touching other areas of the law.  They 
are already entrusted to decide virtually identical legal claims pursued 
by the corporation itself and shareholder derivative actions filed in 
federal court, without any apparent negative consequences.  Civil juries 
are composed of average American citizens who can exercise the 
oversight currently lacking.  Corporate executives’ incentives to act in 
the best interests of shareholders and to fulfill their fiduciary duties are 
increased by the knowledge that jurors similar to their shareholders will 
judge their conduct.  This simple change may produce better 
decisionmaking by corporate executives and may restore shareholders’ 
trust in corporate management. 
352. See Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (authorizing remittitur); see 
also Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (limiting plaintiff to choosing between 
accepting the remittitur and facing a new trial). 
 353. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935) (stating that additur violates the Seventh 
Amendment); Jehl v. S. Pac. Co., 427 P.2d 988, 992–93 (Cal. 1967) (permitting additur). 
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Opponents of this proposal will likely recite the typical criticisms of 
civil juries’ performance in resolving disputes, but empirical research 
undermines the force of those criticisms.  Moreover, important historical 
and policy arguments favor the use of jury trials in civil litigation, and 
those arguments are particularly relevant for shareholder derivative 
litigation.  Corporate executives will undoubtedly argue that juries judge 
them more harshly than individual judges, but that is precisely the point.  
Because judges have traditionally deferred to the decisions of corporate 
executives, judges are perceived as judging corporate executives too 
leniently and thus are not the ideal decisionmakers in shareholder 
derivative litigation—especially in light of recent corporate governance 
failures.  At the same time, for juries to effectively operate as the 
enforcer, the judicial system must restrain judges from improperly using 
pretrial motions to keep cases from reaching trial.  To the extent 
corporate executives continue to irrationally fear juries, they can always 
settle asserted claims.  An incentive to settle exists in all civil litigation 
and settlement has long been encouraged by the American judicial 
system. 
The civil jury plays an important populist role in our democracy.  
Civil juries give a voice to the public when directors and officers, and 
even judges, are out of touch with fiduciary duties and the interests of 
shareholders.  States that deny any right to jury trial in shareholder 
derivative actions, such as Delaware, are anti-populist and widen the 
chasm between management and shareholders.  Extending a jury trial 
right to shareholder derivative actions filed in all courts, would 
reinvigorate shareholder derivative litigation by trusting civil juries to 
decide whether directors and officers have breached their fiduciary 
duties.  In light of continuing egregious conduct by corporate directors 
and officers, empowering civil juries would fill the existing void in 
corporate oversight and help restore the public’s trust in corporate 
management and the stock markets. 
